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Abstract 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of UK and Spanish approaches to counter-
terrorism between 2004 and 2014. The aims of this study are to identify and examine 
comparable counter-terrorism approaches in the United Kingdom and Spain, using both 
theoretical and legal frameworks to underpin the statistical analysis applied.  
Whereas international counter-terrorism has been readily studied in the context of 
important events such as the September 11th attacks, very little work has been conducted 
regarding individual European comparatives. This is seen particularly in respect to 
comparative studies of counter-terrorism development and application, whereby the 
respective experiences of the UK and Spain are relevant.   
To do so, this study chooses three indicators of counter-terrorism: policing numbers, 
security spending, and criminal prosecutions, and undertakes statistical examination 
using national comparatives, and associations with terrorism incidents. Using the period 
2004-2014, it views the analysis through the lens of historical institutionalism and 
measures such events through the roles of institutions, exemplified by attacks in Madrid 
(2004) and London (2005) respectively.   
It argues that while police numbers show little comparable data between the two nations, 
security spending is heavily influenced by economic and external factors in the UK and 
Spain. Similarly, and when correlated with terrorism events, conviction rates expose 
interesting divergences – the use of the criminal justice system in Spain suggest a number 
of historically-institutionalised issues not seen in the UK, particularly through the use of 
the nation’s constitutional reform.  
Finally, it therefore offers a contribution to existing knowledge through suggesting that 
further understanding of historical events and their impact on legislation could have great 
influence on national counter-terrorism approaches. This could be furthered through a 
focus on alternative counter-terrorism strategies, which may show similarly 
institutionalised issues.     
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The thesis examines the key issues in counter-terrorism in the UK and Spain, looking at 
how each nation has differed in their approach to dealing with security challenges. Within 
this, the study will contribute new evaluations on the legal frameworks in place. It does 
so by focusing, specifically, on three aspects: statistical analyses regarding the way each 
nation has used police numbers, its security expenditure and the criminal justice system 
to prevent and punish terrorism. The importance of this lies in the lack of study using 
these research parameters: particularly through the theoretical approach used in these 
dimensions (historical institutionalism) and the time frame to be considered. Although 
comparative studies between European nations have taken place (see work by: Foley, 
2013), the historically-motivated approach to evaluating the UK and Spain in particular 
provides scope for further contribution. The study’s original research uses primary 
sourced data from both countries, validated by the EU’s Eurostat organisation and 
EUROPOL security force (Lavranos, 2013).  
 
1. 1 Background and Questions 
Counter-terrorism strategy in the UK and Spain has demonstrated both consistencies and 
variances in its implementation, often considering a multi-faceted approach to security in 
both nations. While the promise of European homogeneity has provided some direction 
to a common counter-terrorism approach (Boer et al., 2008), any alteration in approach 
or security practice within the counter-terrorism sphere is mainly taken at the national 
level (Van de Linde et al., 2002) with some interaction among the European Union’s (EU) 
security institutions. The terrorism “threat” (Nesser, 2014) shows a need for better 
cooperation amongst the continent’s member states, which may also inform a more 
homogenous counter-terror approach.   
The differences in counter-terror operations between the two nations have been 
traditionally considered a significant gap in the research, as the examination of strategies 
in counter-terrorism success and failure are limited (Lum et al., 2006: 40).  In this regard, 
there is a lack of assessment about the effectiveness of different counter-terrorism 
approaches at governmental or supranational levels. This is also exemplified through the 
11 
 
lack of temporal or longitudinal analyses in comparative studies, despite terrorism’s 
historical frequency. 
Consequently, the study considers the security and counter-terrorism practice of the UK 
and Spain within the importance of its legislation (Monar, 2015), and also the theoretical 
consideration of historical institutionalism. For both legal and theoretical evaluations, the 
subsequent statistical analysis will be conducted across a 10 year period. Ergo, The time 
frame of 2005-2014 is chosen in order to both take into account the changes in strategy 
brought on by the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively, and also 
the decision by the UK to re-consider its position in the EU1. Considering this, the 
following research questions are raised: 
1. What were the major differences/similarities between the counter-terror 
approaches of the UK and Spain in the period 2005-2014? 
2. Have historical events had an impact on the way in which the UK and Spain 
determine their counter-terrorism approaches?  
3. Has attack frequency changed as a consequence of Questions 1 and 2?  
 
The choice to study both the UK and Spain within the context of these questions is defined 
principally by their respective historical experiences; this will feature both in Chapter 2 
through an outline of historical events, and in Chapter 4 through the analysis of their 
respective legal frameworks, which will encompass the assistance and aid of historically-
institutionalised theory. The variance in strategic approach undertaken by both nations 
during the IRA and ETA campaigns respectively helps to illustrate how security services 
may operate in different ways (Alexander, 2013: 24-30). Again, the importance of 
historical motivation to this study makes a focus on both above groups integral to 
understanding modern counter-terrorism.   
The UK and Spain has experienced significant events of terrorism, observed particularly 
through the prolonged campaigns in Northern Ireland (UK) and the Basque Country 
(Spain), which sets it apart from other European examples through the severity and 
intensity of said campaigns. Interestingly, an analysis conducted for the Washington Post 
(Alcantara, 2016) illustrated the upsurge in incidents in countries such as France, whereas 
                                                          
1 The decision to undertake a referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union was confirmed 
in the 2015 General Election.  
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incidents in the UK and Spain have remained consistent, pointing to a changing landscape 
for counter-terrorism in those countries.  
The development of counter-terrorism is as complex as it is difficult to define, due to the 
dramatically changing dynamics behind both security practice and political decision-
making influencing them. This thesis will attempt to take into account conflicts between 
both counter-terrorism mechanics and delicate security cultures that influence the 
decision-making process in European nations. In order to achieve this, the context 
surrounding the choice to examine this comparative should be outlined.    
 
1. 1. 1 Approaching Counter-terrorism  
The very act of terrorism requires both definition and understanding. Terrorism is widely 
considered to be the act of using violence for political or religious gain – in essence, 
spreading “terror” (Hoffman, 1986; Ganor, 2002; Martin, 2015). However, it is a notably 
controversial topic, with a competent definition being extremely difficult to ascertain 
amongst uncertainties relating to insurgency and armed conflict (Hodgson & Tadros, 
2013). With this in mind, reflecting upon the definition of terrorism can leave the 
academic community focusing unduly on categorising how the threat manifests; while 
contrastingly, security services will attempt to focus on the aim of stifling attempts.    
The variety of approaches by individual European nations in counter-terrorism and 
security, and their respective positions in the European Union, requires further 
elaboration. While the Union is not a measured factor in this work, its role and importance 
to the study is important to perceiving how the security efforts of the selected nations 
have differed within its framework. It can be accurate to claim that counter-terrorism 
cannot be successfully defined due to the sheer weight of architectures, laws and 
initiatives that derive from the concept, whereas the facets and norms surrounding its 
policy can be examined theoretically, i.e. through the likes of a historical institutionalist 
lens.     
Actual security activities – and within this study, those pertaining to the UK and Spain 
principally – are structured according to their respective strategic objectives: i.e. 
geographical operations such as community policing, international and cross-border 
activities; or by crime, such as homicide, narcotics or counter-terrorism (Mounier, 2007). 
13 
 
Cooperation and strategic homogeneity in counter-terrorism, therefore, is indicative of 
more than just International Relations (IR) or political expediency – it would require an 
understanding of all counter-terrorism action and intention, alongside a willingness to 
learn from relevant foreign institutions.  
To clarify, some initiatives for counter-terror security undertaken by the UK and Spain 
may help to identify the research rationale behind this thesis. Appendix A compiles a 
number of recent initiatives from both nations discussed in this thesis, ranging from data 
retention (UK, 2014), to laws ignoring the statute of limitations (Spain, 2010) – criteria 
for inclusion is considered in Chapters 4. This breakdown of initiatives identifies some 
differences in decision-making across both national and temporal lines, despite both 
nations adhering to the supranational guidance of the EU at this point. Similarities are 
drawn within certain legal remits, particularly in relation to data access and retention, and 
will be examined further in this work.  
 
1. 2 Statement of the Problem  
Fundamentally, the subject of counter-terrorism brings together conflicts of security, 
nationality, attitude and historical issues. Comparative analysis of counter-terrorism 
strategy allows for investigation of internal and external factors that might impact this: it 
includes actual counter-terror architectures, partisan and possibly nationalistic political 
focus, and even the cultural approaches of differing European nations. Understanding 
how different states use counter-terrorism and its structures could aid thinking as regard 
to the strategies that are altered and adapted for more 21st Century threats. Foley (2013: 
168) identifies this in his exemplification of the UK and France, whom were shown to 
modify their counter-terrorism responses in accordance with the threat environment.      
Selecting the UK and Spain for comparison recognises important “critical junctures”2 in 
their counter-terrorism approaches. In order to do this, similarities relating to the 
historical experiences of the nations should be taken into account in order to inform this 
categorisation: the basis of which considers examples of separatist insurgencies or 
institutional similarities. A number of institutions that may influence UK security 
decision-making are considered, contrasted by the general inflexibility of Spanish 
                                                          
2 See: Chapter 4 
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constitutional rigidity. The aforementioned counter-terrorism strategies: police numbers 
and security funding; prosecutions and convictions; and legislative strategy, will be 
evaluated and quantified.   
 
1. 3 Research Objectives  
This study will provide a comparative analysis of counter-terrorism approaches in the UK 
and Spain in order to explain the variations observed in the implementation of strategic3 
approaches (i.e. prosecution frequency, police numbers or funding) – in-depth 
explanation of how, why and in what context these strategies are elected is outlined in 
Chapter 5. The use of a 10-year chronological benchmark, within 2004-2014, is intended 
to dictate the statistical interpretations of the study, and consequently inform the results 
of any comparative.  
The analysis will involve the following aims:  
i) The identification and comparison of counter-terrorism strategies used in the 
UK and Spain between the years 2004 and 2014.  
ii) The identification of correlations and associations in counter-terrorism 
strategies against attack frequency in both the UK and Spain.  
As set out above, this thesis will focus on the comparative nature of UK-Spanish counter-
terror approaches, with strategies delivering an innovative outlook on the practices of two 
European nations with a markedly similar security history (De la Calle & Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2013: 2). This historical issue marks the justification for both the choice of 
quantitative parameters; alongside the thesis’ theoretical framework, which will consider 
the role of relevant institutions (where available for consideration) in the face of security 
events underpinned by path dependence and critical junctures.  
This study can look at 2004/5 as a year of key event in counter-terrorism, which works to 
explain the critical juncture perspective looked at later in this work. The Madrid and 
London bombings respectively provide a possible juncture influencing institutions, which 
subsequently inform the decision to look at certain counter-terrorism indicators: police 
                                                          
3 In the case of this thesis, “strategic” refers to the strategies employed as measurable security parameters: 
police numbers, security funding, and conviction rates.  
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numbers (aggregated by Europol’s choice to elect for counter-terrorism measurements); 
security funding (aggregated by Europol to work as that dedicated for counter-terrorism); 
and finally prosecutions (successful convictions). This will be discussed in Chapter 7 
under the guise of legal frameworks and constitutional issues alluded to in Chapter 4.  
The objectives set out above are to be set within the framework of a historically 
institutionalist perspective, which intends to consider how different institutions and 
agencies may react to events in both countries. Institutions will be considered as the 
following: 
 National police forces; 
 Finance ministries and offices (respectively); 
 The Criminal Justice System 
Here, the research will sit it within this theoretical framework, considering how different 
counter-terror indicators may vary within evidence of institutional change and 
fluctuation. Most prominently, the study will keep in mind how, alongside counter-terror 
strategies, institutions may or may not be a useful approach for measuring the effects of 
events. 
 
1. 4 Thesis Structure  
The remainder of this thesis is organised around the following chapters: 
1. Historical Context  
Chapter 1 provides identification and analysis of the varying historical contexts affecting 
each case study. The chapter seeks to explain how certain issues affecting each nation 
may have developed into both motivation for terrorist actors, and influence for security 
agencies and their strategies. Such issues include the particular influences and impacts of 
the IRA and ETA on the UK and Spain respectively, looking at the specific, elongated 
campaigns of both groups. This works as a preliminary introduction to many issues that 
feature in the literature within the next chapter.    
2. Literature Review 
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This chapter intends to identify and expose possible gaps in the literature regarding 
counter-terrorism, particularly regarding relevant topics covered by academic work on 
counter-terrorism strategy. In turn, it follows the scheme and focus set out by the research 
objectives above – the chapter alludes to both internal and external factors influencing 
the creation and implementation of counter-terrorism practice in the UK and Spain, and 
how this may affect security strategy. A number of relevant issues pertaining to the 
external influence of the USA; the application of security architectures in counter-
terrorism, with particular reference to the UK and Spain; and theoretical frameworks in 
counter-terrorism, are discussed.   
3. Theory and Legislation 
This chapter provides an outline of the thesis’ historical institutionalist approach which 
results in a better understanding of how the nations referenced, and the respective security 
agencies and systems of justice, engage with counter-terrorism in the context of their 
historical influences. This is followed by an analysis of legislation passed in the time 
period 2005-2014, looking at how historical motivations may have framed decision-
making in legal terms, including national constitutions. Appendix A features the principal 
pieces of legislation that are used for comparison in the time-period analysed in this thesis.   
4. Methodology  
The chosen counter-terrorism strategies, such as prosecutions and police spending 
frequencies, inform the study’s methodology and data collection. Data was collected via 
public-access sources such as the European Commission and where absent, national 
security databases. As such, Chapter 4 introduces the methodology for this thesis, 
describing the data collected and the statistical analysis employed to make sense of this 
data. 
5. Findings 
Chapter 5 discusses the quantitative findings that informed the research objectives. 
Results included limited statistical significance and correlation within the strategy of 
policing numbers in both nations. However, they also revealed divergence in how funding 
was applied in the UK and Spain; more importantly, a huge divergence in the application 
of the criminal justice system and prosecution services was notable between the UK and 
Spain.     
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6. Discussion  
The discussion brings together the results of the data, and any variables outlined in the 
case studies are conducted; this works as a resolution to the thesis’ research objectives. 
Issues of legality, most particularly through constitutional limitations, are reflected upon 
in parallel with results from the data to allude to reasons behind fluctuations in the use of 
aforementioned counter-terrorism strategies in both countries, such as the use of the 
criminal justice system. Important correlations and divergences provide successful 
inferences and create potential links to both former literature and also any future work.  
7. Conclusion 
Finally, all aspects of the analysis, both theoretical and empirical, are compiled to 
complement the discussion, using a holistic approach to evaluating the research 
objectives. The study concludes that while some changeability is evident in police 
numbers across the UK and Spain in terms of its use as a counter-terror strategy, funding 
and prosecutions present a number of interesting caveats for analysis within the 
theoretical and legal frameworks considered in the thesis, such as Spain’s restricted 
legislative approach to counter-terrorism.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Chapter 2: Factors Affecting Counter-Terrorism in the UK and 
Spain: National Histories and the USA 
Countering terrorism is not the result of a single process or one unique mechanism – it 
can be considered as an evolving beast, requiring adaptation and change, considering 
multiple actors, institutions, and priorities. In this regard, factors both historical and 
contemporary are key to shedding light upon the significant cultural and historical 
differences/similarities which underpin the issue of achieving European-wide 
homogeneity in counter-terrorism. The UK and Spain, while not unique in experiencing 
campaigns of terrorist activity, have experienced threats and incidents that can be 
categorised as similar due to their geographic proximity and timescale, with both the 
campaigns of the IRA and ETA respectively reaching heights in the 1970s (Sanchez-
Cuenca, 2007: 1-3; Hanley, 2013).   
Moreover, the similarities between the two cases can also be contrasted with their evident 
differences: disparate geographical and cultural backgrounds provide interesting room for 
comparative analysis. With this in mind, the EU’s principal counter-terror focuses largely 
on international security discourse – for example, with the likes of the United States 
(Segura Raventós, 2015). At national levels, historical context enters the sphere of 
influence due to the relative linguistic, cultural and even demographic divergences found 
in EU member states' political discourse. Such issues are multi-faceted and influence 
counter-terrorism strategy, particularly the way the criminal justice system may be used 
to prosecute suspected terrorism offences.   
The first aim of this chapter will be to outline the counter-terrorism approaches in the UK 
and Spain, considering in particular how strategy may have been affected by the style of 
campaign undertaken by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA) respectively. Secondly, the chapter will look at how the USA and its legislation 
may have impacted upon Europe and its member states. Within this, it is this chapter’s 
intention to provide an overview of key developments and mechanisms prevalent to the 
counter-terror operations of the UK and Spain.  
 
2. 1 Countering Terrorism in the UK and Spain: the Respective Historical 
Impacts of the IRA and ETA  
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Over a period of decades, the UK was forced to confront extremist nationalist insurgency 
from, most notably, the Irish group “the Irish Republican Army” (IRA), which resulted 
in one of the most famous and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies to date in the 
form of the Northern Irish peace process of 1997 (Dixon, 2014). Spain, similarly, 
throughout a prolonged campaign of over 30 years, experienced sustained attack and 
threat from the Basque Separatist group, ETA. This affected national defence, political 
stability and the nation’s economy (Barros, 2003; Alonso & Reinares, 2005; Barros et al., 
2006; Alonso, 2013).  Both campaigns illustrate the changing nature of terrorism (Rasler 
& Thompson, 2009) and how individual nation states react when faced with such an 
extended period of combat – this can be through political policy or security strategy. It is 
therefore important to underline how the representative nations have dealt with the 
continuous threat.   
 
 2. 1. 1 The IRA and the UK 
Firstly, it can be understood that it is difficult to discuss the UK’s contemporary approach 
to counter-terrorism without reflecting on past experiences in Northern Ireland. British 
security efforts to comprehend and combat new threats are inherently linked to this 
campaign on home shores (English, 2013), and the 9/11-centric research often fails to 
consider the historical implications behind counter-terrorism efforts in European nations. 
This is most prevalent in respect to the UK, where terrorism legislation and counter-
terrorism practice has suffered from waves of "presentism" (Lister & Jarvis, 20134), 
focusing unduly on contemporary events. In turn, we see a greater rationale for the 
application of historically-institutionalised approaches to understanding counter-
terrorism in this context.   
Important to the origins of UK terrorism, the campaigns of the IRA provide a strong basis 
for understanding how the country has attempted to diversify its counter-terrorism 
strategy in the face of a transnational threat. In fact, more generally the academic research 
has pointed to the changing public image of the group as being key to the development 
of new security strategies generally (Hanley, 2013); this resulted in a contrast of opinion 
in relation to the terrorist group’s real objectives or plans for the territory. The consequent 
                                                          
4 See Chapter 2 in Lister and Jarvis (2013).  
20 
 
peace process illustrated how the IRA’s plans could be circumvented by political, top-
down policy which avoided further, confrontational, security action. This may be over-
simplified, but opinions have ranged from the complete abstention of violence by the IRA 
post-peace process (Whiting, 2016), to the idea that it was actually less effective in 
counter-terrorism terms (Rosler, 2016). The process was long-term in its approach, 
implying a successfully implemented social and political policy, as opposed to security 
deterrence and military intervention (Hancock, 2008: 32).      
Counter-terrorism and its approaches are often reactive as opposed to pre-emptive, which 
would perhaps allude to the approach employed by British security. It is of particular 
interest to the idea of reactionist counter-terrorism that Gill and Horgan (2013) mention 
the shifting natures of PIRA participants and their targets, with the transition of 
sociological profiles towards more peaceful methods of contention resulting in further 
alterations in homogeneity and group resilience.  
In keeping with the reactionist approach to counter-terror security implied, there is a 
suggestion that this problem went further in the UK case study. There is evidence that a 
significant focus was attributed to backlash-based strategies5, as opposed to prescribed 
deterrence (LaFree et al., 2009b: 19-20). LaFree's analysis revealed that a number of 
employed strategies were found to be more consistent with backlash during the period 
1969-1992, demonstrating a certain immaturity to counter-terrorism practice. The UK's 
response to attacks by the IRA were often considered excessively zealous in nature 
(English, 2013), strengthening this backlash theory, and also postulating an 
institutionalised policy of heavy-handedness based on historical events.  
Within discussions of counter-terrorism strategy, political dimensions are considered as 
a modern possibility to weakening a terrorist group’s capabilities. This was shown in the 
Northern Irish case through the role of Sinn Féin, which through UK national efforts and 
consistent dialogue, worked closely as the political arm of the IRA (McGrath & Gill, 
2014). The power of using political support and dialogue helped not only reduce terrorist 
violence, but also mediate the strength of any public sympathy for IRA activity. This 
managed to alter UK counter-terrorism yet again, on this occasion towards a “ballot, not 
bullet” strategy.    
                                                          
5 LaFree identified “backlash” strategies as those attributed to knee-jerk counter-terrorism strategies or 
reactions after a particular attack or incident during the 1970/80s. 
21 
 
What makes this particular sub-section important to this thesis is the ever-changing 
position that the UK takes when dealing with terrorist activity; and this was most visible 
in the campaign of deterrence against the IRA. Specifically, the transition from zealous 
security management to political negotiation in this case sets the stage to study the UK’s 
counter-terrorism principal influences.     
 
 2. 1. 2 ETA and Spain’s Francoist Past 
Unlike the relatively stable political position in the UK, Spain was forced to contend with 
the political and economic consequences of dictatorship and transitional democracy, 
alongside subsequent, separatist violence in the Basque country. Pertinent to the debate 
on counter-terrorism’s strategic change is the impact of totalitarian control on security 
issues and the state of Spain’s political and geographic diversity. Within this, arguments 
are derived as to the result of ETA’s strategy and target selection being inherently linked 
to the state of Spain’s governance.    
Spain’s counter-terrorism decision-making and strategies have seen the remnants of 
Francoism impact on how the country’s security architecture is managed – structures 
which are affected to this day (Cardona, 2012), and institutions that continue to bear the 
marks of their histories. The politically-orientated focus on terror by Franco’s security 
forces does not allude to current practice; however, the development of over-zealous 
interrogation methods and heavy-handed counter-terror policing has become 
synonymous with many facets of contemporary Spanish security (Alonso & Reinares, 
2005: 4). It is perhaps important to interpret any analysis of current security strategy 
within the guise of Spain’s recent dictatorial rule, and how local communities react to the 
terrorist/freedom fighter paradox amongst other effects.  
Ideologically, while separatist desires have always underpinned ETA’s focus and targets, 
significant evidence found that there was a “national” element to attack strategy (De La 
Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2013; McGrath & Gill, 2014). In essence, the choice to attack 
within the Basque Country predominantly emphasises both the group’s limitations, and 
how counter-terror strategies would have been concentrated. This local focus led to Spain 
taking a belligerent approach to its counter-terrorism practice, justifying the 
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commencement of a “dirty war”6 producing significant bloodshed (Alonso & Reinares, 
2005). This in turn opens the debate to the strength of institutional factors endemic to 
Spain’s attitudes towards terrorism activity and its prevention, which could also face the 
threat of either internment or collusion.     
Of course, this leads to the question of ETA’s survival in the face of a “belligerent” 
Spanish counter-terrorism effort. Inconsistent understanding of ETA’s reactions to 
Spanish security attrition has led to confusion as to the end of the group’s potential – 
while many media outlets and sources attempted to affirm the end of the group’s 
hostilities, the Spanish government has maintained a largely belligerent strategy, as 
exemplified above (Zulaika & Murua, 2017). This divergence only seeks to confirm the 
aggressive strategic position set out and continued from Francoist security architectures 
– police oppression and military failure were both considered as motivations for ETA’s 
expected collapse.   
Following these ideas, it can be argued that ETA’s variations personified the shifting 
focus of Spanish counter-terrorism forces – a more attrition-based attack strategy was 
undertaken from 1978 by the terrorist group, in contrast to a predominantly territorial-
based attack policy (Alonso & Reinares, 2005; Reinares, 2005). Overall, it appeared that 
the shift in attack pattern occurred in tandem with Spain’s transition to democracy and 
changing security focus (LaFree et al., 2012), which is important to arguments of 
institutionalised counter-terror approaches. Interestingly, the result of attrition led to a 
loss of internal support, which could be argued as an unintended consequence of a heavy-
handed counter-terrorism approach (Murua, 2016; Berastegi, 2017).     
Extending this, there was an element of hierarchical diffusion and geographic disparity 
which occurred in cases where time had elapsed, demonstrating how security services had 
adapted and innovated after the fall of the dictatorship (LaFree et al., 2012). It is 
indicative of a Spain in transition that its counter-terrorism focus would be similarly 
affected by changes in political discourse, including the distribution of security forces and 
changing attitudes to belligerency. This refers back to the contemporary struggle in 
establishing ETA’s current threat value – governmental discourse working against 
                                                          
6 Guerra Sucia, in Spanish. This event included paramilitary factions, such as the Antiterrorist Liberation 
Group (GAL), acting allegedly outside of governmental jurisdiction in attacks on ETA soldiers and 
civilians alike. 
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academic assumptions of a finished campaign complicates the process of counter-
terrorism (Zulaika & Murua, 2017).  
Referring back to the political dimensions considered in the UK case study, efforts to use 
this as a counter-terror approach was not acted upon as strongly in Spain. ETA’s political 
arm, Herri Bastasuna, followed many of the dynamics seen in the Northern Irish case, 
but the Spanish state refused to allow dialogue with the group, even prohibiting their 
rights as a legal entity (McGrath & Gill, 2014: 28). This posits an interesting strategic 
divergence in the two case studies, with Spain preferring to rely on attrition-based 
counter-terrorism to reduce ETA’s influence.  
 
2. 1. 3 The Impact of History 
While certain events in the respective histories of both the UK and Spain have influenced 
the decision-making process in counter-terrorism, specific approaches and policies have 
emerged as a direct result, albeit in a limited fashion. Wherein a comparative can be made 
through historical events in the UK and Spain, the policies and strategies that would affect 
the research approaches of this thesis are paramount to understanding the two nations’ 
subsequent security developments.  
Featuring heavily in modern counter-terror legal frameworks, the UK’s CONTEST 
Strategy, compiled and enforced through an effective counter-radicalisation strategy, 
were implemented in 2003 (Vidino & Brandon, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013), and has been 
subsequently updated and advanced recently in 20187. CONTEST was devised largely as 
a prosecution model in order to apply the various legislative processes designated for 
terrorist activity (Macdonald, 2014). PREVENT, as one of the work-streams designed by 
CONTEST, was considered a proactive step to reducing the terrorist threat, as opposed 
to retroactively tracking the culprits – this encompassed the “pursuit”, “prevention”, and 
“protection” tactics to reduce radicalisation within communities. Heath-Kelly (2013), 
however, elicits some of the weaknesses of this approach, proclaiming that the structure 
                                                          
7 Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) 2018 – See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018 
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of PREVENT provokes instability and determines indicators for radicalisation that 
perhaps does more harm than good.   
Moreover, counter-terrorism and its use within the UK constitutional has implications 
beyond the Northern Irish Troubles, with the flexibility of its framework being lauded in 
other case study comparatives – particularly within the United States (Donohue, 2008). 
This being the case, there are also suggestions of negative connotations being attached to 
counter-terror architectures in the UK, with specific reference to the “war on terror” 
period of legislating. The politics of counter-terrorism was further altered by the Northern 
Irish campaigns via parliamentary motions. In 2014, Home Secretary Theresa May 
attached a security amendment to the passing of the Immigration Bill, featuring an 
“externalisation” of terrorist actor identification to non-British citizens (Fisher, 2015). 
That is to say, the association of a terrorist actor being a non-British citizen had continued 
from the Troubles to feature in contemporary counter-terrorism.  
The result of ETA’s campaign Alonso and Reinares (2005: 273) have complemented 
Spanish counter-terrorism attempts by underlining a number of the more innovative, and 
controversial, security measures implemented: this has included the distribution of ETA 
prisoners across the country to avoid the clustering of radicalisation. To this regard most 
of the literature is ETA-centric, with a specific focus generated by partisan political 
opposition and a dependence on security controversies to pass policy (Moreno, 2005). 
Argomaniz and Vidal-Diez (2015) continue the trend of evaluating Spain’s hard-line 
response to the terrorism-political nexus (see: section 1.5), in turn exposing the difficulty 
in ascertaining clear policy-making decisions in counter-terrorism. This is in spite of 
extensive experience and a unified political platform for all governing parties. Moreover, 
it has been recently confirmed by the literature, with Murua (2016) emphasising the lack 
of fundamental support towards ETA’s continued armed struggle, leading to their 
disarmament.  
All of the above seeks to confirm what could be considered a “blurred break with the 
past” (Berastegi, 2017), in relation to transitional counter-terrorism in the UK and Spain. 
The counter-terrorism narrative is complicated additionally by the emergence of a supra-
national Europe, which posed as yet unresolved challenges to two nations with chequered 
security histories. Most importantly though, issues of constitutional importance in 
counter-terrorism strategy will feature in Chapter 4 – in particular, and relevantly for this 
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work, the key divergence noted is the ability to transition to alternate approaches in the 
UK, and the resilience and steadfastness to maintain one security pathway in Spain.  
   
2. 2 The Legislation of the USA 
The influence of the USA on how European nations may conduct counter-terrorism 
cannot be overstated. An example of influential legislation, the USA PATRIOT Act8 of 
2001 (see: GPO: Public Law, 107-56, 2001) was implemented in direct reaction to the 
September 11th attacks, permitting policing bodies such as the FBI far-reaching powers 
such as asset and spending control, and extended tools for border security. This also 
implied the first use of internet surveillance in a counter-terrorism context (Kerr, 2003), 
promoting a new environment within which security measures, and more importantly 
counter-terrorism strategies, are ubiquitous to international focus. It is the significant 
upheaval in security approach observed post-9/11 that gives weight to this study’s 
decision to select data from similarly-levelled events in the UK and Spain respectively. 
The US-EU PNR Agreements9 have delivered a cogent paradigm for the focus of counter-
terror security practice, as it is generally placed within an economic context to defend 
financial or trade interests, including new provisions for customs (Anagnostakis, 2015). 
Similarly, further influence is noted through the EU-US Terrorist Financial Tracking 
Programme (TFTP), which has been proficient in its role of plot detection and the freezing 
of assets. However, there are critiques of the legal precedents within the use of both the 
PNR and TFTP, as the uneven leverage applied to EU citizens by the USA is inconsistent 
with the goals of the legislation (Fahey, 2015): in particular, they prevent any attempts of 
legal redress or review. This applies to leverage across the European continent as a whole, 
as opposed to individually targeted nations.  
EU criminal law policy contains a statement of categorisation for the variety of challenges 
faced (see: Criminal Law Policy, 83(2), Europa) – financial regulations and offences are 
clarified in depth, with only scarce mention to actual legislative processes regarding 
                                                          
8 “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism”.  
9 US-EU PNR (Passenger Name Record) Agreement: this was the agreement between the United States of 
America and the European Union are regard the use and transfer of Passenger Name Records to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (Segura Revantós, 2015).  
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counter-terrorism policy. The European Parliament lies at the heart of the European 
counter-terrorism management model, and the initial obstruction of the US-EU Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) data transfer confers a rejection of this mentioned influence in 
favour of a different approach (Kaunert et al., 2014). The complex relationship between 
the EU and USA in respect to their security challenges provides some basis for 
understanding how two nations may operate within their confines.  
 
2. 4 Conclusion 
The historical experiences of the countries identified above help both to justify their 
position in this thesis, and also work as a basis for contemporary analysis of different 
counter-terror approaches. Both nations’ historically-institutionalised strategies, moulded 
by experience, are multi-faceted, and in some cases massively disparate. 
Returning to the examination of history, it is even more cogent when considered in 
comparison to the USA. It has been contended that strategic culture has been “elusive” 
for Europe due to the huge mix of cultures and histories involved (Rees and Aldrich, 
2005). In fact, the specific cases of the UK and Spain have revealed the difficulties in 
homogenising any counter-terrorism approach, taking into account extended, separatist 
campaigns under national confines. From here, the internal themes mentioned may inhibit 
or at least influence how a strategy may be implemented.  
In Chapter 3, the experiences and factors shown in the above discussion is built upon and 
exposed through the academic literature. This will identify and support particularly 
relevant nuances that may affect and inform the decision-making to study the research 
objectives set out in Chapter 1.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review   
 
3. 1 Introduction to the Literature on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
This literature review focuses on work relating to the security strategies of the UK and 
Spain, and counter-terrorism measures within their frameworks. There will be brief 
mention and reference to work conducted on the European Union´s Schengen Area in 
order to provide perspective on supranational influence. Alongside this, a number of more 
prevalent issues in terrorism research, and matters related to counter-terrorism strategy, 
will be examined with the purpose of underpinning the literature’s observations: 
particularly, those pertaining to British and Spanish transitioning to international 
strategies. Matters surrounding actors, threat and foreign involvement are to be analysed 
within the context of counter-terrorism, and their implications for security policy more 
generally.   
In order to answer the question surrounding the theoretical and empirical variations 
between the counter-terrorism approaches of the UK and Spain, and subsequently its 
contribution to the field of counter-terrorism research, it is important to establish a review 
of the literature regarding how counter-terrorism practice has been exported, adapted, and 
operationalised within these case studies. Thus, sub-sections considering the influence of 
the United States; the counter-terrorism strategies utilised in the UK and Spain, and more 
specifically, the work of Lister & Otero-Iglesias; considerations of the Schengen Area; 
and theoretical approaches to terrorism research, will engage with the relevant literature.    
The numerous theoretical considerations that pervade debate in counter-terrorism are 
present, including how the US has reacted to the pan-European strategies of counter-
terrorism and the historically-motivated struggles affecting them (Crelinsten, 2013). 
Thus, indications as to how theory can impact the methods and approaches to counter-
terrorism will be made evident.  
 
3.1.1 Who and Why in the Act of Terrorism  
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Actors and decision-makers are important to understanding the prevalence of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism-related issues. There is a strong focus upon Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorism, which may compound weaknesses in the counter-terrorism armour, in turn 
diverging from Europe-centric considerations. Silke has attempted to convey this point 
across his research (2001; 2004; 2008), and emphasises the undue focus of terrorism 
research on Jihadism, suicide bombings and data collection within these motivators and 
strategies – this is also evident across much of the critical literature (Moghadam, 2006; 
Jackson, 2007) and is heavily present in work by Schmid (2011; 2013). Such a focus can 
damage attempts to broaden security strategies surrounding counter-terrorism, and inhibit 
any possibility of coherent policy-making, or security decision-making for that matter, 
due to a narrowed focus on selected actors.    
Consequently, the literature has centred on this frame of thinking, indicating that the 
terrorist actor should take precedence over the prevention of incidence. Vidino and 
Brandon (2012: 165) interviewed a number of security officials across the EU to discuss 
such actors, concluding that the identification of an “enemy within”, i.e. home-grown or 
a local terrorist operation, was in fact self-deceiving. This is interesting when compared 
to contemporary research undertaken regarding lone-actor terrorist incidents (Gill et al. 
2014), but does also point to a bigger picture containing implications beyond Islamic 
groups and political Islam. From this, the literature is inferring that counter-terror 
attempts to categorise offenders through radicalised ideologies and attack strategy may 
fail in its consistency.  
To this regard, how are such actors categorised, and how are these incidents distributed? 
The literature indicates that the organisational structure of terrorist entities, both cellular 
and individual, have undergone change (Jordan, 2014), alongside the overall disparities 
in frequency year-on-year. As such, Jordan (2014) compiled attack frequency data from 
1995-2013 across the Spanish Peninsula and categorised across vectors related to actors, 
which illustrated that while organisation-based terrorist activity was dominant until 2008, 
there was a later shift towards lone-actor activity. This is a relatively new challenge for 
counter-terrorism, potentially changing its strategy: here, the perceptions of cell-based 
organisational terrorism are depreciated by the steady increase of lone-actor incidents and 
attempts.  Gill et al. (2014) corroborate this increase, and emphasise its changing nature; 
this being a global trend as well as one merely observed in Spain.  
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Issues of who and why can also distract from much research's focus on prevention, and 
can even lead to confusion in this respect. This is best demonstrated by Sageman (2014: 
576) who proposed the debate surrounding the “stagnation of terrorism research”, which 
was enforced by the following statement: 
“We have a system of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know 
everything but understand nothing, while academics understand everything but 
know nothing”. 
Here, he indicates that beyond national security/counter-terror policing strategies, there 
exists a divergence between the way the subject is studied and understood. This has 
important consequences for the debate on international cooperation: while dialogue and 
debate are essential to academic research, collaboration should be prioritised to maintain 
high quality work. Sandler (2011) offers a number of theoretical and quantitative 
approaches to the terrorism literature; however, again, it is notable that theoretical notions 
such as game theory relay little practical benefit for policy-makers, whereas a more 
informed, empirical basis for strategy would help structure future policy.     
 
3.1.2 The Impact of Terrorism 
Counter-terrorism research considers a range of issues, including the combating of 
methods, strategies and radicalisation used in terrorism. The growth in interest and focus 
on counter-terrorism can be largely attributed to the cultural and political impact of the 
events on 9/11 in New York, which has resulted in the basis for most academic articles 
and a huge increase in research regarding terrorism (Hoffman, 2002; Nacos, 2003; Enders 
& Sandler, 2005; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008; Silke, 2003; 2008). Indicatively, this has 
reflected and perpetuated the dominant Anglo-American focus and conduct of terrorism 
research and International Relations over the past 15 years. Comparative studies relating 
to European states and counter-terrorism, while evident (see: Foley, 2013), are few and 
sometimes speculative in their scope (Zimmermann, 2006).  
As seen in Chapter 1, defining counter-terrorism is as difficult as its coordination, and the 
literature is aware of this problem. Efforts to identify consistencies in the definition of 
terrorism are ubiquitous and provide an ample starting point (Hoffman, 1986; Ganor, 
2002; 2011; Arshad, 2014; Navarro, 2014); comparatively, counter-terrorism does not 
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benefit from such a discussion on its definition, and instead is largely contained within 
the language and discourse surrounding it, resulting in some confusion (Sciullo, 2012). 
The subsequent security institutions in counter-terrorism work within national governing 
frameworks; and the definition of targets, and their impact, can be quite vague 
(Crelinsten, 2013). It can thus be sometimes difficult to ascertain which institutions are 
directly, or indirectly involved in counter-terrorism.     
As such, a target-focused approach to counter-terror can be a nationally-driven issue with 
relatively little international involvement: this is pointed out by Legrand and Bronitt (seen 
in: Prenzler, 2012: 5), whereby the influence and involvement of central government in 
reviewing performance is indicative of how counter-terrorism policing is concentrated. 
This is important to this study’s analysis of policing numbers and its influence on counter-
terrorism. Similarly, arguments have been made to involve nationally-based armed forces 
in the active pursuit of defeating terrorism (Bigo & Tsoukala, 2008), with alternative, pre-
emptive security being superseded in the light of an international threat: however, again, 
such discussions have been largely superficial.       
The concept of threat poses a number of complications for the literature, with Monar’s 
(2014a) interpretation of the EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy10 stating: “national 
efforts are insufficient… the region experiences a common threat”. This, in accordance 
with the security strategy, should be dealt with at a supranational level, questioning 
approaches by nation-states such as those cited in this thesis. The common menace is 
explained by Biscop (2004) who again mentions the overall lack of cooperation between 
the likes of the UK and Spain, with the exception of military intervention in Iraq. As 
mentioned above, viewing the terrorist threat as relative to a cooperated response would 
require both military and policing intervention, which raises the question of “terrorism 
vs. insurgency” (Boyle, 2011), and shifting focus towards the actor. Crelinsten (2014) 
nonetheless positions the resolution of a military or even an increased policing response 
within the scope of state violence and criminality, suggesting that it is not necessarily the 
appropriate reaction to such a threat.   
                                                          
10 EU Internal Security Strategy (2010): an approach and communication set out by the Council of the 
European Union to strategise in favour of five key objectives: Disrupt international criminal networks; 
Identify and dismantle criminal networks; Protect the economy against criminal infiltration; and 
Confiscate criminal assets.  
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Moreover, the term “threat” is not exhaustive, and can involve extant concepts such as 
race relations and immigration (Husbands, 2014) or youth radicalisation (Bizina & Grey, 
2014). To encompass such a broad range of variables that may impact on terrorism 
activity, counter-terrorism must remain at the top of the agenda for the European Union 
(EU) and its decision-making bodies – however, to counter the academic claims, just two 
per cent of the European populous voted terrorism as a major concern in 2012 (European 
Commission, 2012; 14), with results in the UK (15%) and Spain (16%) individually not 
much higher in 2014. Interestingly, radicalised individuals, irregular migration, and 
crime-terror nexuses (Navarro & Villaverde, 2014) all feature as consistent challenges for 
the area, with parameters measuring the threat of terrorism ranking highly against other 
public apprehensions, which may define counter-terror approaches.      
All such points involved in the impact of terrorism can include the influence of media 
outlets and public perception, which in most western participants have centred nearly all 
focus, and subsequent government statements, on Jihadist terrorism (Matthews, 2013). 
Radical Islamist narratives remain dominant across the western media, with little to 
distinguish between terrorist actors, be they religious or secular (Gregg, 2014), or attack 
strategy (Atran, 2003). In essence, it can be argued that analysis conducted solely taking 
into account Islamic-based terrorism acts works retroactively in counter-terrorism. The 
literature is indicative of the Islamist focus (as evidenced in: Mamdani, 2002; Spalek & 
Lambert, 2008), while an evident gap is observed in order to homogenise both the focus 
on actors overall, alongside the measures to obstruct them.  
Terrorism, when measured statistically, is an ever-changing creature which causes 
problems for prospective counter-measures, and the impact of this relates back to the 
debate on definition. It is not so simply evaluated, as an act of terrorism does not always 
conform to a single ideology: Lacquer (1999) posited the idea that we deal not with 
terrorism, but with terrorism(s). Difficulties in categorisation pose problems for research, 
particularly that involving statistical interpretation – this is to be looked at in more detail 
in Chapter 5. In this sense, it is the institutional obligation of the EU and its members to 
assess and comprehend this nature (Ferreira-Pereira & Oliveira Martins, 2012), while 
simultaneously allowing access to collaborative security measures.  
The following sections of this literature review will convey an overall picture of academic 
study’s relationship with counter-terrorism and security strategy, exposing the importance 
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of understanding the roles of the UK and Spain. Firstly, a greater perspective on the trials 
and tribulations affecting the security of the UK and Spain, followed by the involvement 
and influence of the US on EU counter-terrorism. Further literature will include the attack 
strategies of terrorists in said nations, influences of the EU and Schengen, and the 
theoretical standpoints behind counter-terrorism policing and security.  
 
3. 2 Counter-Terrorism: Attitudes in the UK and Spain 
In the UK and Spain, attempts have been made to understand approaches to terrorism 
(Enders & Sandler, 1991; De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006; Lister & Otero-Iglesias, 
2012; McGrath & Gill, 2014) – this work builds on existing comparative analyses with 
primary research and a more focused set of criteria, i.e. police numbers, funding and 
prosecutions.    
 
3.2.1 British and Spanish Counter-Terrorism Approaches: from the 
“National” to the “International”  
This section intends to outline the literature dealing with experiences and counter-
terrorism policies of the two, arguably, most experienced nations in the EU: the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Spain, particularly identifying aspects in the literature to support 
ideas postulated in Chapter 2. Thus, having combated some of the largest terrorist 
campaigns in history (Coolsaet, 2010: 2), both nations represent great contextual 
paradigms for discussion in the literature, which may also provide scope for other 
international efforts as a consequence (Caruso & Schneider, 2011). The literature related 
to a cross-national comparison analysis between the UK and Spain, but is directly 
informed by the thesis’ research objective of identifying policy and strategic divergences, 
culminating in successful (or unsuccessful) counter-terrorism.  
Berastegi’s (2017) work on transitional justices in the UK and Spain are particularly 
relevant to the struggle in transition from nationalist terrorism to a modern, coherent 
strategy. The researcher notes that the “blurred break with the past” (2017: 547) positions 
the debate within the structures of critical junctures, which is an integral feature of this 
thesis’ focus on the historically-institutionalist perspective of counter-terrorism. 
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Similarly, Berastegi (2017: 545) outlines that strategies and initiatives taken by both 
countries to combat terrorism activity, but equally postulates the problems created by the 
past – neither country has put in place any clear resolve as regard the grievances and 
mistakes undertaken previously.   
However, Zimmermann (2006) emphasises the importance of both the UK and Spain’s 
role in an EU-centric counter-terrorism focus-group (the G6), and whose membership has 
illustrated the strategic differences subsequently identified in the literature. Den Boer and 
Wiegand (2014) claim that despite the EU’s Framework Decision on Combatting 
Terrorism (FDCT), only six nations possess clearly outlined counter-terrorism legislation 
– Spain and the UK being representative. Interestingly, this again reflects previous 
comments made regarding the UK and Spain’s respective historical experiences, posing 
the question – do the UK and Spain find themselves in a more advantageous position as 
compared to the rest of the European Union?  
Continuing with this notion, other literature has pointed to dissimilarities between the UK 
and Spain with respect to their approaches towards the victims of terrorism, both through 
the IRA/ETA campaigns, and more recently within the radical Islamic threat. Muro 
(2015) posits that, in a counter-terrorism context, the focus on building a rapport with 
victims in Spain has elicited a positive response with policy makers, becoming a force for 
change in counter-terror strategic approaches. Interestingly however, Criado claims that 
victims can be quite “heterogeneous” (2015: 4), and in turn the agencies being influenced 
by victimology in Spain are impacted more by those victims of high-ranking roles: such 
as officials or politicians.  
Importantly, the word “strategy” in the context of the UK and Spain does not feature as 
heavily in the literature as the policies and legislation surrounding the issue. However, 
certain studies have been conducted detailing counter-terror action in both the UK and 
Spain (Kollias et al., 2011; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Muro, 2015) that offered distinctly varied 
approaches to the challenge of consistent counter-terrorism security in the respective 
nations. For Alonso and Reinares (2005: 268), the development of a renewed counter-
terrorism security strategy in the face of ETA’s threat resulted in new bodies being 
designated to the Basque country, as opposed to the standardised use of the Spanish 
National Police. However this was constituted a failure, and the authors’ emphasise that 
Spanish delegates were sent to the UK for information regarding specific antiterrorist 
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units and information systems. Importantly, Klausen (2009) states that the nationalised 
role of London’s Metropolitan Police is key to the management of counter-terrorism 
action, with a greatly increased budget, as underlined in the article.   
This sub-section has underlined many of the dissimilarities observed among strategic 
approaches by the UK and Spain, as outlined by the literature; this is confirmed despite 
the markedly similar problems experiences by both nations with separatist terrorism. 
Homogeneity is similarly seen as lacking in the literature, which could raise questions 
regarding the actions of other European nations. 
 
3. 2. 2 Counter-Terrorism Policy and Action in the UK and Spain – 
Examining the work of Lister and Otero-Iglesias (2012) 
Of particular importance to this section of literature is the study conducted by Lister and 
Otero-Iglesias (2012): New Problems, Old Solutions? Explaining variations in British 
and Spanish Anti-Terrorism Policy. The study levies a particular focus on the variance in 
counter-terror policy-making in the UK and Spain, with work centring on elements of the 
criminal justice system. As arguably the most relevant piece of literature to this thesis, it 
will be assessed in the next sub-section due to its importance in forming the basis for this 
thesis conception. In turn, this literature review will be an original contribution, 
stylistically, in analysing a single piece in such a way.   
Lister and Otero-Iglesias (2012) point out that the UK has become almost “habituated” 
in their approach to legislating counter-terrorism, a penchant that is not shared by the 
Spanish political system – that is to say that the UK’s approach is generally consistent 
and reactionary, working on a needs-basis. Moreover, it can be claimed that some initial 
framing of legislation in the UK has certain, path-dependent properties that could 
influence any future developments (2012: 580). The establishment of previous strategies 
and the implementation of previous pieces of legislation, such as the thoroughly studied 
Terrorism Acts, will form the basis for subsequent attempts at effective counter-terrorism 
in the UK.   
As will be looked at in detail in Chapter 4, Lister and Otero-Iglesias point out the 
legislative limitations in Spanish counter-terrorism as opposed to those in the UK, despite 
the heavy political consequences of both the 11-M bombings in Madrid, and the 7/7 
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bombings in London (2012: 565). The paper looks at Spain in contrasting fashion, with 
praxis limited to the “grafting of terrorism crimes onto traditional laws”, which in turn 
has left the criminal justice aspect of counter-terrorism relatively untouched (2012: 580). 
Here, the study identifies the strictly opposing nature of counter-terrorism practice again 
seen between the two case studies, with issues of historical institutionalised behaviour 
affecting Spanish decision-making.  
Following this, a further case is made by the authors, strengthening the position taken in 
Chapter 2 regarding Spain’s Francoist past (2012: 577). The “authoritarian” nature by 
which Spain has operationalised its counter-terrorism approaches is not necessarily 
reflected through the decision to avoid infringing upon civil liberties; in fact, the point is 
made that the effects of the dictatorship actually prevent the government from 
institutionalising the likes of control orders11, as seen in the UK. This is most likely due 
to fears and concerns provoked during the country’s totalitarian regime, which in turn 
protected said civil liberties after the transition to democracy.  
Of increasing interest is the paper’s conclusions on the impact of many issues identified 
in this literature review: most notably, the impact of supranational structures and even 
criticisms levied at a priori historical analyses (2012: 581). As such, Lister and Otero-
Iglesias (2012) allude to the difficulties in applying external factors to the study of 
counter-terrorism approaches, and postulate the importance of maintaining a fairly 
national focus on such issues.   
 
3. 3 Influence and Involvement of the USA upon European Counter-
Terrorism 
As a key actor in counter-terrorism, literature regarding the USA and its general impact 
on other international organisations, such as the EU and the UK and Spain, should be 
given proper consideration. The sheer wealth of literature in itself gives support to this 
review’s initial focus on the theme, and how an outline of such may further the 
understanding of British and Spanish decision-making.  
                                                          
11 A control order is the decision taken by the UK home office to restrict the liberty of an individual for 
the purpose of protecting the country from the risk of terrorism (HM Government, 2011).  
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The USA has provided the most significant amount of research into the field of counter-
terrorism since 2001, indicating the level of focus and dedication from both the political 
administration, and the academic community (Pape, 2005: 1-3). In this regard, the USA’s 
reaction to the September 11th bombings has seen significant research conducted 
(Hoffman, 2002; Pyszczynski et al., 2003; Svendsen, 2013; Hoffman, 2015); as a 
comparison, the little informative literature dealing directly with pan-European counter-
terrorism has often categorised the continent’s attempts at counter-terrorism policy as 
weak, or a “paper tiger” (Bures, 2013). This assertion presents notable challenges for the 
study of counter-terrorism among EU member states, as the USA’s influence 
demonstrates further the cultural, economic and situational divergences between them.  
Interestingly, Europe is presented as somewhat indecisive in the literature (Bures, 2013), 
whereby the culmination of internal conflicts and nation-state activism has resulted in a 
climate of internal conflict. This is further exemplified by Smith (2013), who positions 
the conflictive personalities of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers at 
the centre of problems arising in foreign policy and other international affairs. Such a lack 
of multilateral cooperation has resulted in a hole for security policy, which is and has 
been subsequently filled by the direct policy-making capacity in the case of the USA. The 
United States has become an “external actor” within the European deliberations (Kaunert 
et al., 2012a), with considerable influence being exerted upon European counter-
terrorism issues. This is proposed as being due to the largely reluctant position of 
European nations to use military force as a response (Rees & Aldrich, 2005), and as such 
is consequently blamed on structural differences and a predilection of European reliance 
on the USA to deal with issues, i.e. nuclear proliferation.    
In a thematic context, Wright (2006) claims that the classification of a “war on terror” by 
the United States has initiated a political dialogue with focused implications, while 
member states of the European Union have preferred to distance themselves from this 
vision of counter-terrorism. This idea has been further complimented by the law 
enforcement image that the EU has wished to personify, with Monar (2014a) stating how 
criminal justice instruments can vary considerably: the homogenisation of criminal law 
and judicial cooperation on terrorist offences are the main obstacles to conformity. 
Chapter 2 (sub-section: 2. 3) identifies a number of pieces of US legislation that may 
serve as examples of how the criminal justice system is applied in the “war on terror” 
theme.  
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In reference to the “war on terror” (Poynting, 2012), the critiques of the approach surpass 
the semantic and extend beyond the typically US-centric focus. Poynting (2012) looks at 
the UK as falling within this rhetoric, and, at a difference with continental counterparts, 
actually uses the counter-terrorism operations it wages as proxy for missions on foreign 
policy and international war. While the likes of Spain has been shown to categorically 
reject the “war on terror” paradigm (Benjamin & Simon, 2006), the UK has generally 
supported and developed upon much of the USA’s most notable counter-terror legislation. 
Due to the almost European-wide opposition to this notion, the pseudo-military rhetoric 
expedited by the UK/US dichotomy furthers the need to understand how it could function 
within the legal remits of the European Union and its possible “apathy” for the issue 
(Marsh & Rees, 2012). Again, this supports the need for this thesis to look at the UK and 
Spain within an understanding of its larger partners and institutions.    
Continuing within this frame of thinking, Hillebrand (2012: 205) has examined the 
relationship between the USA and EU within its actual counter-terrorism practice. 
Interestingly, she claims that security cooperation is hindered by the USA’s adherence to 
its own focus on state secrecy and national protectionism. The impact of this upon 
coordinated counter-terrorism efforts is two-fold, in that Hildebrand states the issues 
surrounding the EU as an institution compared to the USA’s relationship with individual 
nations. Mah (2014) supports this, exemplifying the UK’s individual cooperation with 
the USA in counter-intelligence terms, which while not directly impacting strategy and 
practice, infer divergences that go beyond traditional counter-terrorism.  
It is important therefore that problems with cooperation and strategic compatibility have 
been ubiquitous to US-European security relations. Lebl (2005) makes the claim that 
there has been a failure on the part of the USA to structure proper collaboration with 
Europe due to the Union’s non-formalised condition as an entity. This is again enforced 
by Bures (2013) within the claim that counter terror legislation, whether prescriptive or 
otherwise (Roele, 2013: 4) in Europe, fails to resonate across its numerous member states. 
Consolidating Europe’s position as a non-federal supranational body is inhibited by its 
own member states, ensuring the need for individual member state case studies to provide 
clarity. For this reason, this thesis focuses on the divergences in the security engagement 
of two of Europe's most influential nations.   
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3. 4 EU policy and its impact on state security: The Schengen Paradigm 
As proposed in Chapter 2, external factors to the counter-terrorism practice of nations can 
influence and impact on its implementation. Thus, it is relevant to consider the EU’s 
border-control mechanism as a tool that has proven contentious for counter-terrorism in 
the literature. The Schengen Area of Free Movement12 has resulted in a recent, large-
scale, and multi-faceted interpretation as regarding what the concept means for individual 
states in security terms (Casella-Colombeau, 2015; Pedersen, 2015; Alkopher & Blanc, 
2016).  Within this research dynamic, a number of issues and problems have arisen 
ranging from intelligence tools and technology (such as EURODAC), to theoretical 
concepts (such as trust).  
Balzacq and Léonard (2013) affirm that member states share intelligence and information 
regarding border-protection to prevent potential suspects receiving a Schengen visa. This 
also implies that the intelligence-sharing platform that exists between different European 
states is proportional to the provision of Schengen visas to prospective applicants. This 
platform can involve those parties who do not belong to Schengen, but may influence its 
decisions to award visas on counter-terrorism grounds: O’Neill (2010) observes this 
through the UK’s requests to part-take in Schengen’s acquis, including creating a role for 
the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). In this regard, the importance of the 
block stretches beyond its confines and is impacted by its very institutions. Again, if the 
EU’s own institutions fail to cooperate effectively, hopes for homogenous approaches 
between nation states would be slim. 
Immigration is perceived as key to Schengen’s controversy, as opposed to migration 
between European countries. Alkopher and Blanc (2016) identify changing attitudes in 
belief and “trust” towards the mechanism; nations’ security agencies appear to be more 
willing to take decisions unilaterally, with a recent rise in immigrant-based threat 
perceptions aiding this willingness. In further support of this mistrust, Fijnaut (2015: 326) 
discusses the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis on the Schengen area. Changes in attitude 
towards the open-border policy of Schengen have been re-evaluated since the crisis, and 
                                                          
12 The Schengen Area can be defined as: member-states in agreement to adhere to the “acquis” (rules) of 
the EU’s internal border-mechanism that allows the free movement of all those possessing European 
citizenship (Europa) 
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Fijnaut finds that policing services have become overwhelmed; even considering the 
abolition of Schengen as a viable solution to the security threat posed.    
Similarly, the lack of faith in the mechanism’s ability to maintain safety in the face of 
lowered borders is emphasised by Pedersen (2015). He maintains that in spite of the 
consequent set-up of the Schengen Information System (SIS)13, its limitations to policy 
intelligence has shown an ignorance of security issues. However, Pedersen does endorse 
some of the potential counter-terrorism tools of EURODAC14, which is steadily becoming 
more investigative within the counter-terrorism environment. This is an interesting 
perspective, as it shows improvement upon Baldaccini’s (2008) previous examination of 
these security mechanics: the SIS had become “a reporting and investigatory tool” (39-
40), while EURODAC was considered inconsistent in its measurements, with results “to 
be questioned” (43).  
In support of Schengen’s dealings with security and terrorism, Avdan (2013) undertook 
a detailed, globalised analysis of transnational border mechanisms and the impact of 
terrorist activity. The author extrapolated data from many incidences of cross-border 
migration, including Schengen, and concluded that the dimensions of terrorism are a 
result of globalisation. In this sense, the Schengen area is not an isolated case, and national 
borders will experience the same level of critique regarding its counter-terror operations. 
Again, it is apparent in the literature that conflict arising from the institutionalisation of 
sovereign nations’ approaches to counter-terrorism, as opposed to the problems caused 
by deregulated border control (Fijnaut, 2015).       
To conclude, Schengen does not appear to feature very positively in the literature, with a 
wide raft of concerns and problems identified within the mechanism’s security policies 
and provisions. The dynamic surrounding the Schengen area has significant implications 
for the countries studied in this thesis, particularly as three out of four belong to the group; 
the UK’s position outside of the block providing a suitable comparison. As such, the 
area’s free-movement principle entails a clear challenge to counter-terrorism in an age of 
migration from the Middle-East to Europe, presenting an underlying and institutionalised 
concern on the part of European security services.   
                                                          
13 Database to provide further information on individuals or properties within those nations in Schengen 
(Europa). 
14 European Dactyloscopy: fingerprint database specifically designed for non-European entry into the 
Schengen Area (Europa).   
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3. 5 Theoretical Approaches to Understanding Counter-terrorism  
While the central theoretical standpoint underpinning this thesis is the historical 
institutionalist perspective within counter-terrorism practice, a consideration of 
alternative approaches taken by the literature will be evaluated here. Security as an 
academic concept has met with substantial discussion and subsequent theorising in its 
changing approaches over the last century (Bullock and Tilley, 2012); importantly, such 
discussions have tended to encompass cultural theory and the application of sub-cultures 
within the counter-terrorism sphere, portraying a largely nationalistic interpretation of 
security efforts. Tyler (2012) substantiates this through an evaluation of work by Jones 
and Libicki (2008), in which an empirical report supported the idea of local security 
measures, i.e. through direct policing, may benefit attempts at reducing events.     
Rees and Aldrich (2005: 906-7) outline the theory of “Strategic culture” – the 
understanding that a nation’s experience with counter-terrorism is based on its previous 
altercations or dealings with the issue. This works closely alongside historical 
institutionalism and in reference to the UK and Spain, the study clearly outlines the 
impacts of previous incidents upon both countries, emphasising it as a comparative with 
the US and the EU as an institution. Similarly, this theory draws on the idea of an internal 
enemy, previously discussed above by Vidino and Brandon (2012), which underlines the 
impact of internally-developed terrorist actors. While the historical and cultural dynamics 
of the UK and Spain pose interesting questions for the literature, security cooperation and 
mergers formed through European directives has attempted to limit the effects of national 
divisions in security strategy (Schmidt & Zyla, 2013). 
Policy-making in counter-terrorism has been subjected to a number of theoretical 
challenges, with speculation often evident as to the best possible route for both detection 
and prevention (Jackson et al., 2009). With reference to the UK and Spanish security 
contexts, the use of game theory has become applicable to both case studies, largely due 
to their significant historical campaigns and consequent sample sizes. Sandler (2003) 
emphasises the UK’s Deterrence vs. Pre-emption approach in counter-terrorism, positing 
the probability factor in choosing whether to seek-out and eliminate targets, or choosing 
to make attacks more difficult. Furthermore, game theory has been used previously to 
reference Spanish counter-terrorism, and the impact of terrorism incidents on visiting 
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tourists (Enders & Sandler, 1995). Here, game theory exposes the economic ramifications 
of terrorism activity, providing a window into policy-making consequences outside of 
security and counter-terrorism strategy, and how the actions of security forces can become 
the cause of long-standing negative consequences for social cohesion.      
The literature theorises further with regard to counter-terror security strategy, and states 
that the theory of “Bureaucratization” (Deflem, 2002; 2004) is able to explain how certain 
elements of policing function in a globalised world, despite restrictions to its national 
jurisdiction. Deflem (2004: 78) argues that the dual focus on the “(intra)national and the 
international” helps state police forces to identify terrorism in both its domestic and 
international forms. Consequently, this element in the literature poses a conflict with 
community policing approaches to reduce the terrorist threat, and produces a theoretical 
debate as to ascertaining a balance between international cooperation and local efforts to 
reduce the spread of attacks. The perception that outward threats are merely an extension 
of normal security functions echoes the problems with homogenisation, and consequently 
informs this study.  
According to Criado (2015), the impact of terrorism on public voting behaviour is well 
documented and profoundly evident across the literature (Davis & Silver, 2004; Berrebi 
& Klor, 2006; Fielding & Penny, 2009; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009). This wealth of 
literature has purported to offer support for any consistency in terrorism activity – in 
essence, they must be relevant to the general populous and have a direct impact on day-
to-day living. This theory relates directly to the public-security nexus in its base form, 
providing opportunities of thought within the idea that the public must influence the 
security agenda taken for dealing with terrorism.     
While considered a separate line of investigation by political sociologists, cultural theory 
has been seen to inform security practice in counter-terror research (Hood, 1995; Sparks, 
2001; Cooper, 2002), containing particular relevance to cross-national comparisons. This 
entails a perspective on nationalistic and “social” approaches that focus principally on 
internal security issues, yielding further understanding of the difficulties faced in 
international cooperation. Thus, in order to inform discussion on divergent counter-
terrorism strategy, it is necessary to examine why this is perceived as a “community” task 
(Cordner, 2014), as opposed to an internationally-orientated duty (Rogers, 2015). It has 
been drawn from the literature that counter-terrorism approaches must be proficient in 
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both local and external security matters, ranging from youth radicalisation in the Europe 
(Lynch, 2013) to modern, international armed groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Shabaab (Hoffman, 2015).    
Finally, while this sub-section looks predominantly at counter-terrorism theory, the 
theory of collective action has been significantly outlined in the literature as an 
explanation for the continued rise and escalation of terrorism violence (Oberschall, 2004). 
As established by Obserschall, collective action can be classified by four dimensions: (1) 
discontent; (2) ideology-feeding grievances; (3) capacity to organise; and (4) political 
opportunity (2004: 27), which provide the fundamental strategies for prevention 
undertaken by police forces universally. This theoretical approach is regularly cited 
across political science (Sandler, 2004) and goes further in order to contend with the 
motivational factors behind transnational terrorism and Jihadism. As stated, problems of 
discontent and ideological grievance are supported by international relations research and 
its related theory (Alexander, 2013; Malik, 2013), and demonstrate the precursor factors 
to violent acts. In contrast, security focuses on the capacity to organise and the prevention 
of cell-clustering and structural dimensions of actors (Hoffman, 2013; Rossmo, 2014; 
Bailón, 2015) have distanced themselves from theoretical approaches to focus on 
scientific and engineering solutions to the problem.  
Theoretical approaches can suffer from their inherent lack of evidence to support their 
conclusions; as a pragmatic mechanism, counter-terrorism and security strategy enjoys a 
predominantly empirical research strategy, with statistical analysis, data collection and 
other quantitative mechanisms often employed (Lum et al., 2006; McGarrell et al., 2007; 
Huq et al., 2011). The literature has evidenced the weakness in positing theoretical 
perspectives in counter-terrorism, as opposed to discussing the motivations of terrorist 
acts (Cottee & Hayward, 2011) where it has generally prevailed in critical research. It is 
conducive to this thesis to understand nonetheless how such theoretical standpoints can 
underpin and explain the decision-making of security forces, which allow for a more in-
depth approach to research strategy and methodological approaches.    
As has been mentioned continuously in this study, the underlying, theoretical 
consideration of historical institutionalism is present, and will be developed in detail in 
Chapter 4. Existing literature has drawn on the above theories, but this is limited because 
of the largely nuanced nature of cultural theories. This study’s approach addresses this by 
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employing historical institutionalism to use real events and institutions in order to inform 
counter-terrorism strategy. It will continue the discussion upon how such theory has 
informed much of the legislation, policy-making and counter-terror methodology 
undertaken in recent times.   
 
3. 6 Conclusion 
In concluding this review, the variance in approaches, strategies and contexts applied to 
both the British and Spanish case studies create both opportunities to identify gaps and 
also support the thesis’ central research objectives. As such, a number of possible 
implications are raised by the literature which would potentially hinder or benefit further 
investigation into the subject. The linear approach undertaken by the USA has greatly 
influenced the security processes of European nations and underlined their difficulties in 
collaborating efforts. O’Brien (2016) presents a fairly comprehensive analysis of counter-
terrorism policy and strategy across Europe, and is particularly relevant to conclude this 
literature review. The researcher confirms the overall consensus shown in this review, 
regarding the inconsistency and lack of coherence evident in European counter-terrorism. 
O’Brien maintains that the “messy counter-terrorism policies” of European nations (2016: 
15) allow a certain reverence to be attached to those of the USA.   
Similarly, the situation is greatly exacerbated by the conceptual definition applied to the 
likes of the UK and Spain, whom despite an investigative and policy-driven stance, appear 
disjointed; in the meantime, the USA’s war on terror has defined the international 
spectrum on counter-terrorism. Overall, the literature has looked at such contrasts with 
the purpose of providing scope for international cooperation, and for this reason this study 
has also chosen the comparative approach. It is important to gain true perspective on the 
policy-making and strategic actions of various nations within the European context in 
order to identify possible issues preventing homogenisation.  
The difficulties made apparent in different regions of the EU inform this study’s focus on 
counter-terrorism in member states, and this analysis of the literature has identified a 
number of gaps and possibilities for research, including but not limited to: (a) limitations 
in theoretical underpinnings to counter-terrorism research; and (b) studies relating to 
measurements of counter-terrorism effectiveness. It could be asserted from the literature 
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that there may be a need for different measurements of success and failure, i.e. parameters 
such as prosecutions or funding parameters – though academic research continues to 
converge principally upon political mechanics and motivations behind terrorism. A clear 
mandate for such future investigation is made, which provides this thesis with the support 
and relevance to the field.    
A variety of subjects, themes and issues affecting counter-terrorism have been posited, 
and similarly have exposed many divisions and issues in strategy; the disparity in these 
themes have taken precedence over the limited pan-European analysis in the literature. 
The intention of this thesis will be to evaluate certain strategies not developed upon by 
the literature, and discuss factors influencing security approaches to counter-terrorism in 
the UK and Spain more generally.    
Such strategies would include the measurement of the counter-terror indicators alluded to 
in the study’s research objectives (see: Chapter 1). By measuring and postulating 
rationales for any association between these indicators and terrorism activity, alongside 
an understanding of key institutions in this context, the study hopes to produce originality 
in the field.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Chapter 4: Theory and Legality – a Consideration of Historical 
Institutionalism and the Impact of Legislation on Counter-
Terrorism in the UK and Spain 
 
This chapter will outline the importance of theory, and then consequently how it can be 
used as a lens for policy – this will examine how counter-terrorism may be approached, 
in spite of its traditionally, strategy-orientated focus (Coolsaet, 2010; Heath-Kelly, 2013). 
In the first instance, the importance placed on history through Chapter 2 of this study 
defines the decision to look at the role of institutionalised, historically-motivated counter-
terrorism positions in the UK and Spain.  
Within the context of counter-terrorism, the following institutions can be considered 
relevant, particularly with respect to the study’s research objectives: 
 National police forces; 
 Finance ministries and offices (respectively); 
 The Criminal Justice System 
Through the analysis of historical events and issues upon such institutions, the statistical 
analysis in this thesis will be underpinned, and a clearer image of relationships and 
associations would be gained. Foley underlines the importance of understanding how 
historical legacies may shape policy that could reduce the “likelihood of efficient 
outcomes” (2013: 76). This supports the structure of this study – using historical events 
and discussions in association with institutions and counter-terrorism indicators to 
determine possible rationales.  
The chapter will also consider the use of legislation in both nations, looking also at how 
historical positions may differ and how constitutional compliance may influence each 
country’s strategic attitudes. 
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4. 1 The Theory of Historical Institutionalism  
Historical institutionalism works as a theory to find patterns and sequences across 
institutions, and across time (Immergut & Anderson, 2008). It aims to underpin research 
objectives through the use of traditions, institutional nuances, and even philosophical 
approaches to justify, in this case, political and security decision-making.   
The value of historical institutionalism to political and security research is underpinned 
by its relationship with transition and change. Firstly, Almond (1956) emphasised the 
theory’s origins in rejecting the linearity of time as an impacting factor on decision-
making. Instead, he postulates that the decisions not taken could constitute a valuable 
phenomenon in discussing rational choice. It is here that historical institutionalism finds 
its foundations, and seeks to differentiate itself from other theories that concentrate on 
events that have occurred.   
In this case, the theory helps to outline how historical events shown in Chapter 2 may 
explain how the various security agencies in the UK and Spain interact to deter and 
counter terrorism activity. As Thelen (1999) points out, institutions are capable of 
evolution and at times show tendency to adapt in situations of urgency. This again relates 
back to events and experiences seen in Chapter 2 – security strategies and institutions 
diverged significantly in the UK and Spain respectively, particularly in the face of serious, 
on-going campaigns from the IRA and ETA respectively (McGrath & Gill, 2014).   
While the above point may appear to contradict the essence of the theory through its 
regular reactions and adaptations, there is evident support for the claim that institutions, 
particularly those involving security as in this case, are “sticky” (Wolff, 2009: 139) – by 
this, “sticky” is referencing the inability to properly adapt to significant events, or in a 
proper, effective time-frame. Wolff continues here by criticising Thelen’s (1999) “critical 
junctures” and instead insists upon Europe’s natural shortcomings in resources and 
cooperation in regard to counter-terrorism strategy and policy-making.  
It is here that comparative analyses revive the issue of how the theory should be applied 
to security and counter-terrorism, with the numerous junctures observed in recent 
events15. Critical junctures are important in interpreting how national institutions respond 
                                                          
15 As of 2011, Syria has been engaged in civil war, leading to a migratory crisis directly affecting 
European nations (Lazaridis, 2015). 
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to shocks or events, and particularly whether different responses can be seen in the UK 
and Spain. For example, while the criminal justice system in the UK has adapted 
significantly to junctures such as the 9/11 attacks through the adoption of the 2001 
Terrorism Act, no direct financial institution was set up to provide oversight of security 
finance in light of this event.    
Schmidt et al. (1999) provided a framework to underpin the importance of historical 
institutionalism and how its origins, and development, can be interpreted in accordance 
with the “timing of events and the phases of political change” (1999: 2). Relevantly, this 
is mentioned in the EU context by Argomaniz, who emphasises the need for research 
surrounding this and what he also describes as the “critical junctures” in the process of 
institutionalisation: post-9/11, post-Madrid, post-London (2009: 26). Here, this thesis’ 
research questions surrounding the time period for analysis (2004-14) are supported by 
the literature. It is interesting to consider that significant institutional change was arguably 
brought about mainly by the campaigns of the IRA and ETA, as opposed to other, smaller 
groups more recently (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007; Argomaniz & Vidal-Diez, 2015) – 
speculatively this could be due to public interest, security funding issues, or other external 
factors.   
As a whole, the importance of historical institutionalism is that it is a) structural, whereby 
it encourages us to look beyond the interests and perceptions of individual actors - which 
may help explain certain continuities; and (b) a riposte to the presentism (Lister & Jarvis, 
2013) of much work on counter-terrorism which discourages us from looking at the past. 
This historical inflection matters in both the UK and Spanish cases, because of their 
longstanding engagement with violent incidents termed “terrorist”. Importantly, the 
choice of research parameters in this thesis are again supported by historically-
institutionalised nuances, whereby the decision to focus on numbers, as opposed to actors 
or persons, is fundamentally important.   
The consideration of historical institutionalism in a counter-terrorism context will require 
a level of policy-making understanding to provide support for its role. The chapter will 
then be divided into sub-sections, firstly discussing how historical institutionalism may 
work in the context of counter-terrorism strategies in the UK and Spain, particularly 
across a number of variants (i.e. cultural history); and will then be followed by criticisms 
and limitations of the theory’s applications. Secondly, the chapter will look at both the 
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legislative and constitutional impact on how changes may, or may not, be implemented 
in counter-terrorism strategy.   
 
4. 1. 1 Considering Historical Institutionalism within the Context of 
Counter-Terrorism Strategies in the UK and Spain 
Whereas much of the USA-based academic literature on counter-terrorism strategy has 
been framed within the context of contemporary, international terrorism (Argomaniz, 
2009), Here, academics should consider looking back to the past in order to comprehend 
how the threat may be interpreted differently. This thesis discusses the impact and 
possibly institutionalised implications of the respective histories discussed in Chapter 2, 
and also how the respective security strategies employed by the UK and Spain may be 
influenced, with respect to the relevant institutions therein.  
To exemplify, some of the key institutional choices/decision-making to affect the UK 
could include: 
I. The creation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in 2003, under the 
guidance of the UK intelligence services16.  
II. The creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility17 in 2010 in the UK.  
III. Acts passed by the UK criminal justice system, including the Justice and Security 
Act of 2013, and the Counter-terrorism and Security Bill of 201418.  
While further attention to the legal and policy actions taken by both nations within an 
institutional context will be looked at later (see: Sub-section 4. 2), what is most notable 
is how few actions of institutional change has taken place in Spain. What appears most 
clearly when examining both the literature and history of the country, is a willingness to 
adapt and alter the institutions currently in play, such as the structure of the existing 
national police force (Navarro & Villaverde, 2014). This works directly in contrast to the 
                                                          
16 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, MI5. Retrieved from: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090918184334/http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/joint-terrorism-
analysis-centre.html 
17 Office for Budget Responsibility. Retrieved from: https://obr.uk/about-the-obr/what-we-do/ 
18 Counter-terrorism security, JUSTICE. Retrieved from: 
https://justice.org.uk/our-work/areas-of-work/criminal-justice-system/counter-terrorism-security/ 
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re-structuring of key institutions in the UK, which may change in order to contend with 
contemporary issues.    
Returning to Foley (2013)19, the key debates surrounding institutional norms and their 
relationships with counter-terrorism policy are explained in a similarly pertinent, cross-
European comparative – looking at the UK and France. In relation to this study looking 
at the criminal justice system, Foley posits that generally the UK’s judiciary has moved 
in a “broadly similar direction” to that of its French counterpart, whereby the sovereign 
institution of parliament is largely respected (2013: 68). This positions the UK in a 
markedly dissimilar comparative with Spain, where judges have made significant 
attempts to block or alter legislation proposed by the Spanish parliament (Bailón, 2015). 
Within the forum of security, Keohane (2008: 9) identifies a clique mentality, or “inter-
institutional rivalry”, which is moreover contentious.  In terms of possible identifiers of 
institutions affected by historical events, these could include major European security 
institutions such as Europol, or national security agencies such as the Counter-terror 
Command of the UK Metropolitan Police Service or Spain’s Guardia Civil (Civil Guard); 
all of which constitute significant counter-terrorism policing services.  
Historical institutionalism can help to identify reasons behind the possibly different 
approaches by security institutions in the two nations. In fact, Spain had attempted to 
place their domestic counter-terrorism strategies on the European agenda before the 
events in Madrid (Argomaniz, 2009), which indicates a desire by the country to see their 
own strategic approach applied on a grander scale. In the UK context, fossilised security 
approaches may be less clear, with adaptability seen as key to progressive, legal change, 
in direct contrast to that of Spain20. This theory is best applied in this case to the criminal 
justice system – its institutions and its structures through the legal frameworks that 
underpin it, which are to be addressed in sub-section: 4.2. Consequently, the lack of 
alterable terrorism acts in Spain, as seen in the UK and noted above, constrain the 
institution of the criminal justice system, instead pointing the research in the direction of 
constitutional path dependence.           
 
                                                          
19 Foley, F. 2013 (See: Chapter 2)  
20 See: Section 4. 2 
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4. 1. 2 Criticisms and Limitations of Historical Institutionalism in the 
Context of Counter-Terrorism 
Criticism can be levied at historically institutionalised considerations, however, and 
Steinmo et al. (1992) posit the idea that historical institutionalism is inappropriate in its 
discussion of event sequences, in that it removes from the equation the importance of 
causality and randomness from political and social events. Here, the criticism centres on 
the inability to foresee such events, which consequently impact upon the political strategy 
employed, altering said strategy intensely: the events of September 11th, 2001 in New 
York, led to great political change, such as the creation and installation of the Department 
of Homeland Security and the passing of the PATRIOT Act.  
Immergut has written at length on the debate on historical institutionalism and its role in 
political discourse (1998; 2006; 2008), with valid critiques made of the approach – issues 
surrounding the role and importance of selected institutions can inhibit the extent and role 
history can play. There is some relative confusion as to how both constructivist and 
rationalistic elements are applied to defining how the “historical” is used, and to how 
previous attempts at said definition have further complicated the issue (1998). Equally, 
historical institutionalism is not the only theory that attempts to avoid “presentism” 
(Lister & Jarvis, 2013), with a number of the theories exposed in Chapter 3 also suitable 
to this study.  
Events causing disruption to European political discourse and process can be considered 
more influential than institutionalism, particularly in reference to how the above-
mentioned “critical junctures” (Thelen, 1999) are mapped out in accordance with such 
events. The likes of the September 11th terrorist attacks or the European migrant crisis 
illustrate how crisis events will alter the focus of institutions, and in turn their decision- 
and policy-making – this is prominently seen in the legislative and policy-making of the 
countries analysed in this thesis (See: Appendix A).  
Returning to Immergut, his understanding of the multi-layered historical perspective is 
predicated on the fact that:  
…no single model of change or the impact of past events can do justice to the 
multiple levels of causality at work in historical explanation (1998: 254). 
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Here, it is demonstrated that the adaptation of institutions for strategies or political 
decision-making, particularly if applied to the dynamic of counter-terrorism, is limited by 
the extensive factors that can influence them. Such factors could include pan-institutional 
mechanics, such as financial establishments – the role of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) is tantamount to the relationship between a variety of European institutions, 
indicating that recent institutional creations may have as large, if not greater, impact upon 
strategic decision-making across all political spheres.  
As mentioned previously, events can similarly affect the process of strategy; 
institutionalism is limited to this extent, through its lack of adaptability and flexibility 
(Immergut, 2006). In the case of national police forces, it can be argued that theoretical 
notions generally fail to appreciate that the institution’s natural character is to adapt and 
change. Almond’s original rejection of linearity can impede any real connection between 
historical institutionalism and the counter-terrorism research methodology to be 
employed in this thesis (1956), as rational choice plays a significant theoretical role in 
terrorism acts. 
Continuing with the theme of limitations, significant literature and discussion regarding 
the changing face of terrorist threat provokes some contradiction in a historically-
motivated counter-terrorism strategy. Prominent research (Ganor, 2002; 2011; Schultz & 
Vogt, 2003) has endorsed the concept of an ever-changing terrorist threat, which 
challenges discussions looking at the study through an institutional lens – variance in both 
attack strategy and group membership has been set out as a possible alternative 
framework for security services to adapt policy. With this in mind, this thesis is working 
on a limited time-scale due to the constant alterations observed in terrorist activity, which 
causes problems in utilising a historical institutionalist perspective.  
  
4. 1.  3  Countering the Limitations of Historical Institutionalism 
In spite of such critiques and limitations, the effects of historical junctures and events 
upon significant security institutions in the UK and Spain are an important framework for 
counter-terrorism research. Even more fundamental to this particular research, the 
importance of the “junctures” (Thelen, 1999) in 2004 and 2005 respectively should be 
considered when analysing any counter-terrorism approach in the time period chosen, 
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particularly in reference to institutions affecting security. Most importantly here, the 
identifying of historical issues of nationalist terrorism as identified in Chapter 2 help to 
provide the framework for counter-terrorism before the incidents in Madrid and London, 
which presented an international threat to public and government alike. Furthermore, due 
to the level of both public and governmental attention paid to both events, especially in 
the context of ongoing security challenges, the theoretical choice is again justified: public 
opinion alongside governmental policy would inform decision-making by institutions.  
Considering security, finance and justice institutions within a counter-terrorism 
framework creates a viable link with the statistical parameters of this thesis (See: Chapter 
5). As shown in sub-section 4.1.1, any decision to alter the respective authority of 
security-influenced institutions falls under the jurisdiction of national parliaments and 
assemblies. This is important, as the influence of changing acts of legislation, such as that 
seen on the UK Criminal Justice System, forms a strong basis for a historical 
institutionalist perspective that supports a cross-national comparative model of analysis.  
While there may be some lack of adaptability in institutional relationships with political 
issues (Immergut, 2006), this very deficit is central to understanding case studies with 
experiences resembling those of the UK and Spain. As will be examined below, the 
rigidity, or adaptability, of legislation would work as a significant marker of this 
theoretical underpinning, which can in turn be used as a comparative measurement. While 
the presentism considered above also features in alternative theories, historical 
institutionalism is unique in framing legislative and legal processes within critical events, 
whereby the very documentation of such events aids the theory further (Immergut & 
Anderson 2008: 362-3), using institutions to sequence behaviour over time.  
Historical institutionalism is an appropriate underpinning for a study considering such 
research questions, and postulating ideas of comparison based upon experiences. Its role 
in this study will seek to provide further understanding and rationale to both the legal 
understandings below, and the quantitative analysis in later chapters. 
 
4. 2 Legality and Policy-Making: the Impact of Changes to Legislation and 
the Importance of the Constitution in the UK and Spain 
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Academic research has suggested that individual nations will alter and implement 
legislation on security issues, particularly those that have seen change through historical 
institutions (Van de Linde, 2002; Silke, 2004). Through this idea, it identifies a number 
of events and junctures that may potentially result in policy divergence via the security 
institutions considered here. Below, some of the key pieces of counter-terrorism 
legislation are outlined and evaluated, illustrating the cases of the UK and Spain.  
 
4. 2. 1 Counter-Terrorism Legislation in the UK and Spain (2006-2014) 
Within this thesis directly, historical institutionalism aids understanding as to the 
direction of counter-terrorism strategies in the UK and Spain, specifically how the multi-
faceted relationships between EU institutions could impact on how it oversees 
antiterrorism. Returning to Argomaniz, there is some evidence for how European nations 
may have ignored the “weak mandate” (2009: 168) proposed by the EU’s Counter-Terror 
Coordinator, enforced by political decisions by aforementioned national governments 
within the EU’s institutionalisation. It is the reactions and approaches by the national 
governments focused upon in this thesis that assist the researcher in deciphering how 
counter-terrorism strategies may change. Here, the strategies to be measured will be 
evaluated temporally in order to view these nations in a historically institutionalised 
perspective.   
This thesis posits that legislation is the progression of historically-motivated decision 
making, and in this case patterns will be identified within the time period of his thesis 
(2006-2014) – encompassing focus from the most significant acts of international 
terrorism on European soil in 2004 and 2005 respectively21. Considering both the above 
mentioned approaches and legislation, and as shown in Appendix A, the following pieces 
legislation are outlined below: 
UK: 
 Terrorism Act, 2006 
 Terrorism Act, 2006/7 (Updated) 
 Justice and Security Act, 2013 
                                                          
21 Madrid bombing, March 2004; and London bombings, July 2005.  
54 
 
 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, 2014  
       
      Spain22: 
 Law on Electronic Retention, 2007 
 Organic Law (5), 2010 
Above, the legislation successfully passed consists of those acts passed into law 
considered relevant for terrorism prevention by Europol's TE-SAT Report. Thus, there 
must be relative objectivity applied as to how laws are categorised under counter-
terrorism – the association of, for example, data retention and its ability to counter 
terrorism is relative to the respective political body categorising it. In this case, the 
decision by Europol to position such articles and pieces of legislation as such will be 
considered as accurate representation of counter-terrorism definition23.  
It is evident in the first instance that only two clear incidents of relevant counter-terrorism 
legislation took place in Spain, and this is interesting to the thesis and its identification of 
divergence. While this is in accordance to Europol’s measurements, we can see yet 
another divergence in approach between the two countries, and this is best illustrated 
below by looking at the use of constitutional practice in applying counter-terrorism 
approaches. Within a historical institutionalist perspective, it can be inferred that despite 
similar experiences and similar junctures, the UK used legislation as a counter-terrorism 
strategy to a greater extent than Spain, with the UK’s greater institutional adaptability 
evident again.    
Moreover, the changes in legal processing of counter-terrorism in the UK and Spain are 
indicative of differing approaches to what is categorised – that is to say that the laws 
outlined above, and explained in Appendix A, illustrate alternate, strategic considerations. 
For example, while both the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, 2014 (UK) 
and the Law on Electronic Retention, 2007 (Spain) possess notably similar aspects in 
respect to governmental intervention in accessing data and electronic information, the 
                                                          
22 Again, it must be emphasised that Spain has not generally implemented individual acts of legislation, 
and instead adapts the current Código Penal.  
23 See: Chapter 2 for further clarity on this topic.     
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development of Terrorism Acts in the UK alludes to more concise and clear steps in 
defining its counter-terror approach.  
The successive Terrorism Acts in the UK, in particular reference to those passed within 
the 10-year period studied, are key to understanding how the country legitimises its 
counter-terrorism approaches. As demonstrated previously by Lister & Otero-Iglesias 
(2012), the fluctuations in counter-terrorism legislation in each country respectively must 
be considered along narrow, institutional factors. That is to say that the progressive 
Terrorism Acts of the UK are formed by the institutionalised nature of British politics, 
implying that there could be an element of British political culture aiding this decision-
making, i.e. the lack of a constitutionalised approach.    
  
4. 2. 2 Counter-Terrorism Legislation and the Role of the Constitution 
The link between any historical events and experiences, and counter-terror legislation 
lends itself to be considered within the nation’s political framework – in this case, that of 
the UK and Spain. The design of national constitutions tend to reflect institutionalised 
mechanisms, such as those seen in historical experience and critical junctures (Immergut, 
2008), and this can be viewed in the decision to adhere to a codified24 constitution. The 
stability provided by codification also results in a degree of limitation in how future 
legislation can be applied, predominantly in the case of subjects delicate to the public, 
such as security. This is of course not suggesting that other factors do not exist that may 
also influence the debate, such as political culture or cross-party consensus.     
The UK presents an interesting case in this respect – by not having a codified constitution 
in place, the UK possesses the flexibility to adapt itself both politically and legally in 
accordance with such “junctures” mentioned before. Similarly, the lack of codification 
doesn’t restrict it to any definition, with new constitutions mentioned in academic circles 
(Bogdanor, 2009). In keeping with the above-discussed implementation of Terrorism 
Acts in the UK as a security strategy, the constitution of the UK provides ample room to 
model new ideas and learn from experience. This is interesting, as all Liberal democracies 
                                                          
24 “Codified Constitution”: A written document, defining the nature of the constitutional settlement.  
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should possess mass parties that engage with “constitutional opposition” that would 
consider alternative policies across all legal issues (Neal, 2008: 49). 
Again, returning to the measurement of counter-terrorism through security-influenced 
institutions, the Spanish constitution is a reflection of the country’s transition to 
democracy (Druliolle, 2008). As such, its implications for counter-terrorism are 
tantamount to the flexibility of the nation’s constitution – the Spanish constitutional case 
shows a certain rigidity in comparison to that of the UK. This rigidity is the key element 
to linking both the choice of legislation adapted for counter-terrorism (or lack thereof) 
and the historically institutionalised nature of the nation’s strategies. To enforce this 
further, the Spanish constitution has only been altered twice, and on neither occasion was 
it a matter of state security25. This returns the debate to the concept of path dependence, 
which explains that certain issues or events can have disproportionate consequences on 
institutions26. The Spanish constitution, in consequence, is affected by previous 
dictatorial pathways, which prevents change in its respective policing, financial and 
criminal justice institutions.    
Lázaro (seen in: Lister & Otero-Iglesias, 2012) saw the Spanish constitution as ever-
suffering from the “smell of the old regime”, alluding to a serious lack of trust and support 
for the security services, and within this, the rights of citizens to be protected from 
terrorism by clear, politically-backed strategies.  
…the fact that Spain has a written constitution with legal safeguards on individual 
liberties is important. By contrast, Britain with its unwritten constitution and 
principles of Parliamentary sovereignty, where no Parliament can bind its 
successor, means that Parliament can, in significant part, pass any law for which 
it can gain a Parliamentary majority (Lister & Otero-Iglesias, 2012: 16).  
All such concerns related to how the Spanish constitution’s role in forming counter-
terrorism legislation tend to form around historically-motivated stagnation and a 
stubbornness in the face of contemporary threat. In this respect, the position of the UK, 
both in its lack of a codified document and also through its more democratic past, is 
                                                          
25 Firstly, in order to provide universal suffrage, and secondly to raise the debt ceiling in 2011 (Reyes, 
2015). 
26 Seen in: Liebowitz, S.; Margolis, S (2000). Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics. p. 981. Journal of 
Law and Economics.  
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arguably stronger when forming policy and legislation – the relative freedom to legislate 
on terrorism, removed from the problems of democratic transition can be seen as a 
strength. 
  
4. 3 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to gauge an understanding of both the derivation and 
fundamental tenets of historical institutionalism, and also how its position in viewing 
security decision-making could allude to issues in counter-terrorism and security. Within 
this, while underlying concepts of institutionalism may deliver some informative 
perspectives for counter-terrorism, there is also some critique and limitations evident in 
the debate of historical institutional validity.  
However, the huge value that can be placed on historical events and junctures should not 
be understated in this work, and how changing institutions such as the police or the 
criminal justice system may be observed through them. Importantly, the literature’s 
ability to reveal associations and comparatives between the UK and Spain provide the 
underpinning for this study’s choice of research methods. The lack of directly relevant 
literature that measures counter-terrorism by indicator presents a potentially original gap.   
It is both relevant and interesting to this thesis to continue its theoretical focus, as in turn 
it assures the directional validity of the data to be evaluated, and the academic value of 
the research objectives proposed. Similarly, both theoretical and legal considerations 
discussed in this chapter will be alluded to once again in Chapter 7 in order to postulate 
explanations for the statistical analysis to come.   
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                                    Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
This methodology chapter will explain firstly how methodologies have been constructed 
in counter-terrorism research; this will be followed by a justification of the methods to be 
employed in this study – including their limitations – and finally how the actual tests and 
methods were carried out and how they work in turn.  
For clarification, as set out in the introduction, the research questions of this study are: 
1. What were the major differences/similarities between the counter-terror 
approaches of the UK and Spain in the period 2004-2014? 
2. Have historical events had an impact on the way in which the UK and Spain 
determine their counter-terrorism approaches?  
3. Has attack frequency changed as a consequence of Questions 1 and 2?  
 
Fundamentally, the choice of indicators (policing numbers, security expenditure, and 
prosecutions) correspond to three stages of counter-terrorism: on the ground through 
police action, through increasing spending, and in an ex-post environment through the 
criminal justice system.  
Below, I outline some of the key features used in this study’s data analysis: the use of 
Global Terrorism Database (GTB) data, longitudinal studies and chronological patterns 
of terrorism events, and previous attempts at studying counter-terrorism in a statistical 
concept of this thesis – police numbers, security expenditure, and prosecutions as counter-
terrorism strategies. For further clarity, Appendix B offers a clear break-down of all tests 
used in tabulated form.  
 
5. 1 Background of Methodological Use in Counter-Terrorism Research 
This section will outline how the most prominent methodological approaches to terrorism 
and counter-terrorism research have been tried and tested. The evaluation of European 
counter-terrorism policy has taken on a largely “dimensional” approach, in particular 
linking to the prominence of single-case study research (Wolff, 2009; Ferreira-Pereira & 
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Oliveira-Martins, 2012; Kaunert, 2012b; Mackenzie et al., 2013), with geographical, 
political and even historical dynamics considered necessary for contemplating models on 
counter-terrorism.  
The methodological approaches to terrorism research have been summarised by LaFree 
and Dugan (2015), who proceeded to construct a chronological break-down of the most 
consistent methodological approaches in the study of terrorism. Amongst the chosen 
positions, the “series hazard model” of research, first described by Dugan et al. (2005), 
develops a model befitting the policy-event impact nexus, which in turn illustrates the 
importance a policy can have on selected events. This was furthered more recently in 
research by Argomaniz and Vidal-Diez (2015), who applied ETA’s case study to this 
approach, discovering that some counter-terror strategies were in fact detrimental and 
caused further attacks; this has been supported by other approaches comparing electoral 
participation (McGrath & Gill, 2014) while other research sources have deviated focus 
towards group-based analyses.  
In more specific terms, some research approaches have focused upon the nexus between 
political action and electoral involvement among European terrorist groups, considered 
as a counter-terrorism method (De la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2006; Sanchez-Cuenca, 
2007; LaFree et al., 2009a; De la Calle & Sanchez-Cuenca, 2013; Newman, 2013; 
McGrath & Gill, 2014). Such studies have supposed the study of terrorism incidents in 
relation to a group’s political allegiances. This methodology uses comparative models to 
correlate electoral participation and terrorism incidents quantitatively, in order to inform 
future policy-making. 
Lum et al. (2006) outline a critique of the danger of data collection in selected 
methodologies, particularly those applied in measuring counter-terrorism. The 
acquisition of data related to published research topics, with a significant 18.1 per cent of 
peer-reviewed articles pertaining to weapons of mass destruction, and a mere 0.6 per cent 
discussing domestic terrorism is pertinent; continued further by a concerning lack of 
articles on counter-terrorism strategic effectiveness. This in turn illustrates the focus on 
the “extraordinary” and grandiose in terrorism research (Schmid, 2011). Thus, it can be 
argued that the focus of predominant literature remains to underline particular events and 
incidents as opposed to homogenising policy and prevention.    
60 
 
Following this and returning to his cross-European comparative, Nesser (2014) posits a 
disparity amongst the chronological distribution of attacks within the Jihadi context, and 
the heavily skewered methodological approaches attributed to the subject. 
Understandably, Nesser’s (2014) position could be derived from the “Islamification” of 
the terrorism threat as set out above. The Islamic fundamentalist challenge has largely 
encompassed the literature’s focus, and Nesser has innovatively challenged these 
perceptions (2014). Thus, certain methodological approaches, particularly through 
categorisation of events or through data collection, can be inferred as having suffered 
from bias – however, while attempts to quantify terrorism avoids such pitfalls due to its 
empirical nature, they suffer from other limitations.  
 
5. 1. 1 Data Analysis Models and Methods   
This thesis applies a quantitative approach amongst its analysis, resulting in a need to 
outline some of the more common methods to using statistical tools. Amongst these, 
methods employing Bayesian probability analysis of terrorist threats (Cornell & 
Guikema, 2002), and game theoretic risk analysis (Bier & Azaiez, 2009) have often been 
utilised in order to hypothesise on terrorism and counter-terrorism issues. Attempts at 
axiomatically deriving conclusions allow for the overall progress of quantitative terrorism 
analysis, however they can be predominantly graphical – as in, it can be understood 
visually through graphs, in turn facilitating comprehension – which in many cases best 
reflects the scope of the collected frequency data (See: Leiken & Brooke, 2006, for 
examples). All academic audiences can benefit from such use of data, and its expression 
can aid the overall picture of the research better – of course, using descriptive rather than 
purely inferential tests can be useful but also problematic (Silke, 2004).  
However, problems exist in terms of quantifying both counter-terrorism approach and 
terrorism occurrence – Young and Findley (2011) identify some of the pitfalls of such 
investigation, which also includes the premise that counter-terror approach and terrorism 
occurrence are connected in the first place. They maintain that researchers must be 
explicit regarding the implications of the unit of analysis applied, with year-on-year 
datasets no longer unique in dyadic analysis methods across terrorism research, 
supporting the claim of a “stagnation” in research (Sageman, 2014). Similarly, Frey and 
Luechinger have criticised the aggregating of frequencies for terrorism research, stating 
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that an analysis of “cost” would better help to provide a more coherent aggregated data 
index; this consequently would better manage the severity of terrorism incidences (2004). 
This is, however, not factoring in that year-on-year temporal or longitudinal 
interpretations of quantitative or qualitative data is still utilised across terrorism research 
as the most appropriate graphical tool to indicate transition or adjustment (Caruso & 
Schneider, 2011; LaFree, 2012; Schmid, 2013).  
Moreover, longitudinal study has shown to be an effective tool – Barros and Proença 
(2005) conducted an estimated logit-analysis featuring a US/EU comparative of the 
International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorism Events (ITERATE) database, available 
over a 20 year period. This is effective through the ability to quickly and efficaciously 
identify trends that aid better-informed strategy. Other research sources, as indicated by 
Perer and Schneiderman (2008), critique the effectiveness of grouping terrorism 
incidents, with particular reference to the application of metrics and statistical 
visualisations of this categorisation. As explained further, working under umbrella terms 
such as “Global Jihad” can in fact infringe good practice in using data analysis in 
terrorism.   
A number of quantitative comparisons conducted between ITERATE and the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) have demonstrated a significantly elevated level of attack 
frequency in the latter’s collection, exposing the variance in collation method used with 
the GTD’s focus on events and intelligence as compared to ITERATE’s use of global 
media sources (Enders et al., 2011). Interestingly, recent literature has vindicated the need 
to adapt the current taxonomy of terrorism database categorisation – Berkebile (2015) 
advocates a cross-national domestic database, as the researcher makes the claim that the 
GTD is unsuitable for domestic study, leaving room for comparative studies such as this.  
Finally, in particular reference to the analysis of security funding in this thesis, Danzell 
and Zidek undertook tests of statistical significance reflecting the security spending of a 
number of representative Western nations (Danzell & Zidek, 2013). This study concluded 
that increases in spending did reduce terrorism frequency across the years 2000-200927. 
Furthering this point, the research identifies the spending patterns of Western nations as 
being not only important to policy analysis, but also relevant to predictive models of 
events. It is pivotal that the recognition of this correlation informs both the literature and 
                                                          
27 See Chapter 7 for further analysis of this issue.  
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this thesis – this illustrates a justification for research that would include the critical events 
of terrorism in 2004 and 2005 in the UK and Spain specifically.  
Most importantly to this thesis, this outline of methods – and more specifically, data 
methods – provides a foundation for the rationale behind using a mixture of the historical 
institutionalist theoretical underpinning, legal and legislative frameworks, and finally a 
quantitative analysis.  
 
5. 1. 2 Case Study Analysis and Comparative Study 
The cross-national comparative nature of this thesis is fundamental to testing its 
underlying research questions. However, taking into account this study’s use of historical 
events, a case study-based methodology can be carried out that exercises and outlines the 
numerous factors affecting attempts at counter-terrorism. By cross-national, this study 
intends to conduct its statistical analysis through a direct comparison of both national case 
studies, the UK and Spain, comparing the strategies therein.  
Due to this comparative line of investigation, it is important to consider the role of case 
study analysis and comparative approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism research. 
Thus, the nature of comparing political entities or nations has resulted in the creation of 
strict methodologies that permit a homogenised approach to analysis, although this is not 
guaranteed and may in fact imply more divergence through historically-institutionalised 
decision-making.  
The need for rigour and consistency in case study analysis results in the decision to 
compare cases to become more reliable in turn. Lijphart (1971) provided one of the first 
critical analyses of the comparative method, underpinning the similarities, and 
applications therein, of both the case study and comparative methods. Importantly, 
Lijphart drew upon previous research to critique comparative research’s reliance on the 
empirical generalisation of limited cases. This was followed by Geddes (1990), who 
importantly outlined the risk of selection bias in political analysis – hence the importance 
of valid sources of data (See: sub-section 4. 2. 1). In this case, the selection of the counter-
terrorism approaches of the UK and Spain is based on previous experiences of mediating 
significant terrorism campaigns, and hence valid sources of data that have been previously 
extrapolated.    
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There has been quite a clear focus on studying counter-terrorism based on a certain “unit” 
of measurement – as in, studying one aspect of counter terrorism such as events or 
strategies to derive more accurate conclusions. This indicates the need to ensure that the 
case studies conducted in this thesis are focused to a clear unit, i.e. counter terrorism 
strategy. In line with this, Yin (1994) proposed a consistent approach to case study 
analysis across multiple fields of social science. This approach features numerous 
strategies to conducting successful case study research, including the key factors 
underpinned: clear research question, theory, unit of analysis, and replicable methods.  
Continuing and reinforcing work by Yin, Gerring (2004; 2006) outlines how case studies 
are best defined and their central purpose to research. In order to provide an empirical 
basis for his definition, the case study is denoted as a “unit attempting to illuminate 
features of a broader set of units” (2004: 343). Through the revelations drawn by studying 
individual units of counter-terrorism, inferences can be made on broader issues. This, 
subsequently, provides the researcher with a clearer understanding as to research designs 
using case studies, supporting Yin’s categorisation of units for analysis – emphasising 
this study’s focus on the correlational nature of assessing counter-terror strategy, as 
opposed to causation. For example, in this study, information derived from a counter-
terrorism strategy would be informed by a country’s constitutional 
openness/restrictiveness, or vice versa.      
Yin (1994) subsequently underscored the case study strategy for research, and exposed 
the strengths of the case study method through its variety and validity. In particular, Yin 
notes that the case study should be significant and should be presented neutrally and 
without agenda. These arguments are fundamentally important, and this research will 
support the need to remain neutral in respect to how the case studies will be presented – 
however, the value freedom element is controversial, due to this study’s theoretical focus 
on institutionalism and its underpinnings.  
Below, the formal stages of this study’s methodology will be explained and set-out, taking 
into account the issues raised by the sub-sections above. Questions considering the 
validity of comparative case studies, methodological weakness and quantitative analysis 
will provide the basis for a reliable process of methods.  
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5. 2 A Mixed-Methodological Approach 
Methodologies, and the choices to use varying styles and forms of method, dictate a 
thesis’ overall purpose, in turn directing the manner by which it will test its central 
research questions. To this regard, this study has chosen to undertake a mixed 
methodological approach, or a triangulated approach as it is otherwise known (Jick, 1979; 
Brannen & Coram, 1992; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). This idea is essentially based on 
two varying methodological styles which support a research strategy as a device to cross-
validate the basis of the study. With this in mind, the study tested two main lines of 
quantitative research – cross-national comparatives of counter-terrorism strategies 
selected, using means-testing statistical instruments; and secondly, a comparative 
examination assessing the impact of said strategies on attack frequency in the UK and 
Spain using correlational statistical tools.   
 
5. 2. 1 Data and Variables 
To measure such issues in the case of the UK and Spain, the following counter-terrorism 
indicators are considered: 
 Police numbers;  
 Security spending;  
 Prosecutions (convictions) of terrorist offences. 
A second stage of the data analysis involves the above indicators being correlated and 
examined alongside: 
 Terrorist incidents in the UK and Spain from 2004 to 2014.  
Principally, this thesis’ decision to look at these indicators is taken from the European 
Commission’s choice to evaluate them in its counter-terrorism trend reporting (see 
below). Existing literature, as seen in Chapter 3, tends to look at counter-terrorism in 
terms of institutionalised security indicators, such as intelligence analysis (Torres, 2014). 
This is limited because macro-factors, such as spending, may not match how political 
actors think about such concepts – as evidenced by the European Commission’s Trend 
Reports. Following this, the researcher also considers the viability of access to counter-
terrorism evaluation, and how the public could scrutinise counter-terrorism practice – in 
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this regard, policing, funding and the criminal justice system are arguably the most 
accessible forms of assessment.     
The decision to measure counter-terrorism strategies through public-access security data 
is as indicative of the data’s reliability as it is of the importance of easy accessibility. 
Thus, the study focussed on data that can be easily extracted and replicated in a research 
environment, avoiding the pitfalls of bias and any institutional issue that may be provoked 
by analyses of national strategies. Similarly, while prosecutions are analysed as a counter-
terrorism strategy, completed prosecution cases leading to convictions are used. As 
mentioned above, the accessibility of this study’s elected counter-terrorism strategies 
would allow for a multitude of cross-national analyses to be undertaken.  
The data for the statistical variables implemented in the study was collected via certain 
governmental and academic sources, including the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)28, 
Europol's Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT)29, and Eurostat30. The use of 
Eurostat and TE-SAT is particularly important to the study’s choice of data – national 
data sets, however constructed, may contain elements of bias (Jongman, 1988; Enders et 
al., 2011; Berkebile, 2015). In order to avoid this, an EU-wide collection of data provides 
stronger assurances of independence as regard a comparative national analysis, while also 
remaining neutral as an institution within a supranational body. Also, in order to avoid 
bias in the selection of cases and data, the TE-SAT report provides categorised data sets 
under certain parameters, i.e. policing numbers involved in counter-terrorism activity.  
Eurostat and the TE-SAT reports used (years from: 2004-14) chose to aggregate data for 
each country of the EU in the following manner: 
1. Police numbers for the UK and Spain are those that are considered those officers 
in active service across all crime. Due to terrorism existing as a crime that is 
combatted from community to international policing, this Eurostat population is 
considered a valid dataset to analysis.  
                                                          
28 Data with regard to terrorism incidents in the UK and Spain were extracted from the GTD in the years 
2004-2014 
29 Data with regard to prosecution rates in the UK and Spain were extracted from EURO TE-STAT 
between the years 2006-2014.   
30 Data with regard to police numbers and security funding was extracted from Eurostat between the years 
2004-2010 and 2006-2012 respectively. 
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2. Security funding is considered as all funding dedicated to public safety and order 
in the European Union, according to Eurostat. This includes policing, 
intelligence, counter-terrorism and infrastructure, all sources that works to 
counter terrorism activity. 
3. Prosecutions are culminated from conviction rates released by the TE-SAT 
reporting. The EU Council Decision on the exchange of information and 
cooperation concerning terrorist offences, of 20 September 2005 
(2005/671/JHA), obliges Member States to collect all relevant information 
concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law 
enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences (TE-SAT, 2011) 
The GTD is considered to be one of the most complete, available databases for counter-
terrorism incidents, and provides scope for both attempted and successful attacks (LaFree, 
2012). Furthermore, the GTD possesses to tools to identify accurate datasets according to 
the type of study – this can be exemplified through this study choosing all attacks for 
measurement, regardless of success. Additionally, Eurostat and Europol’s TE-SAT are 
the EU’s principal public-access sources for both terrorism issues and statistics of both 
counter-terror strategy and approach across the continent – however the rate of release 
for each TE-SAT trend report is not complete for every parameter and this must be 
considered.  
Similarly, in using the GTD to measure terrorism attacks in his study, all incidents are 
inclusive of both successful and unsuccessful attack frequency – the researcher feels that 
counter-terrorism can only be properly assessed when compared to all attempts of 
terrorism, providing they fall under an official categorisation of a terrorist act via 
recognised sources, such as the GTD, which relies on recognising terrorism in a particular 
way, i.e. not including state terrorism. While this could be seen as problematic (See 
below: 5. 2. 2), the success of multi-faceted prevention (i.e. radicalisation and event-
prevention) is included in the analysis. 
To clarify again, Eurostat and Europol’s TE-SAT reporting is used as the principal 
decision-maker for the validity of data, and as such (a) police numbers are aggregated as 
a force working at all levels of the security process, (b) security funding is aggregated 
according to all finance dedicated to terrorism and threats, and (c) prosecutions are 
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aggregated based on successful convictions using the criminal justice system in both 
countries.  
 
 5. 2. 2 Limitations of Data Collection and Methodology 
As expressed above, there are limitations to this study – this includes the availability of 
datasets and regularity of year-on-year Eurostat and TE-SAT trend reports. Naturally, this 
similarly extends to the way attack incidents will be quantified and collected, with the 
GTD including both successful incidents and failed: this can influence the way that 
counter-terrorism strategy is measured (Frey & Luechinger, 2004). Despite the 
justification above, there is a risk in assessing terrorism attacks by overall attempts, 
instead of focusing specifically on successful events. The many possible factors that could 
be the cause of event failure or disrupted attempts could interfere with an accurate 
analysis correlating such results with counter-terror indicators, particularly in national 
contexts.  
Evaluating this issue more in depth, nations may not have provided suitably detailed 
measurements for evaluation – i.e. on most occasions, the UK withheld information from 
the TE-SAT on the rationale for arrest or prosecution. This was seen in particular 
reference to the first Counter-Terror indicator for measurement: police numbers, where 
Scotland was not included for analysis. Therefore, the decision was taken to undertake 
individual analyses for cross-national comparatives (See: sub-section 5. 3. 1), and then 
aggregated in the second stage of analysis (See: sub-section 5. 3. 2). Furthermore, the 
difference in years studied for each counter-terror indicator is a cause of inconsistent 
patterns of results released by TE-SAT – this was mentioned in sub-section 5. 2. 1 and 
causes this methodology to look at each counter-terrorism strategy individually, and in 
their respective time restraints.  
Following on from this, and as mentioned previously, the categorisation and definition of 
counter-terrorism practice is limited by the study’s choice to derive data from Europol’s 
public access sources. This means that the researcher takes for granted that all three 
indicators and strategies to be tested fall under this categorisation, and are considered 
accurate, i.e. again, that police numbers, although measured as a whole, would work 
would work to actively deter terrorism in all its forms. Similarly, further individuals and 
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agencies could be active in this preventative process: such as examples of security 
professionals, e.g. border control guards or private security firms. The access of these 
documents was achieved through admission to documents through the EU’s central 
information portal31.   
Returning to police numbers, the choice to consider overall police numbers in this 
analysis is in part due to restrictions on data availability in the Spanish case, whereby the 
exact and accurate identification of elite unit numbers would be inconsistent. The analysis 
of elite units would be useful, and as shown in previous research (See: Foley, 2013: 158-
9), can produce interesting results. However, it can also be argued that the nature of 
contemporary policing is inherently multi-faceted, resulting in all aspects of policing 
being involved in the counter-terror effort.     
Other issues affecting research validity32 have become evident, most particularly in terms 
of choosing a time-period for analysis – the UK took the decision to leave the European 
Union on the 23rd June, 2016. This has informed the study’s decision to implement a time 
frame of 2004-2014 in order to maintain parity within the countries compared. The 
rhetoric and influence of the Brexit33 decision has influenced policy-making and in turn 
counter-terror approaches – it was thus deemed necessary to treat the conditions for 
analysis equal. Due to the datasets for counter-terror approaches being extrapolated from 
the EU’s Eurostat and TE-SAT reports, withdrawal from the Union will later result in 
data for the UK becoming unavailable in this report.  
Furthermore, issues within the actual counter-terror strategies may impact upon how the 
data is both interpreted, and the conclusions derived. Evident variations in the economic 
output and populations of both nations does affect how security funding would be 
expressed in a time-series analysis – it would be advisable in this case to produce an 
analysis that considers the actual expenditure in terms of GDP value of each nation, as 
opposed to uniquely considering exact numbers.   
  
                                                          
31 Last Accessed (March 2018) via: https://www.europol.europa.eu 
32 In this study, validity refers to the accuracy of the time-period considered for analysis, and why the 
UK’ decision to leave the European Union could create inconsistency. 
33 Brexit: term used to describe the prospective withdrawal of the UK from the EU. 
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5. 3 Methods and Process of Data Analysis 
The study employed a two-part, quantitative analysis of counter-terrorism strategies in 
the UK and Spain. Due to the need for statistical software to be used in order to carry out 
these tests, SPSS34 was chosen to produce all non-graphical statistical analyses. 
Following this, Microsoft Excel will be utilised to produce the most visually-helpful 
graphics for longitudinal study. Below, the process of examining the data extrapolated 
will be outlined through the statistical techniques and graphics necessary to consider 
implications for counter-terrorism in the UK and Spain.   
  
 5. 3. 1 Methodology: Cross-National Comparative of Police Numbers, 
Security Expenditure and Counter-Terrorism Prosecution Rates in the UK and 
Spain 
I. Tests of Distribution 
The first stage of analysis employed both statistical tests and graphs to examine counter-
terrorism strategy data, and inform comparisons between the UK and Spain. The analysis 
is divided into two subsections: firstly examining the UK case study, and secondly Spain. 
The data was initially examined in terms of its validity for distribution and variance – this 
was conducted through two analyses of distribution: Friedman’s Two-Way Analysis of 
Variance and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, which was undertaken for each counter-
terror indicator in turn.  
Both tests above are selected to test the reliability of distribution in repeated 
measurements of a single sample35 – in this case, the sample data for each individual 
counter-terrorism strategy analysed. When testing for distribution, SPSS takes the 
decision to select the most appropriate tool, i.e. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. Similarly, 
SPSS is able to ascertain statistical significance through its ability to rank the data and 
discover if its p-value is below 0.5 automatically. There are of course limitations to this 
type of testing if data is not ordinal (Derrick & White, 2017), however that is not an issue 
in this case.  
                                                          
34 Statistical Package for the Social Sciences. 
35 Randomly selected piece of data from a larger population. 
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The tests are used predominantly to measure and compare matches samples, assuring the 
normal distribution for further inferential36 analysis (Perer & Schneiderman, 2008). 
Moreover, such tests of variance ensure statistical significance for the data used, and the 
sample taken.  
 
II. Tests of Mean Value 
Following this, a one sample t-test was undertaken for each counter-terrorism strategy in 
turn, independently examining the data for each nation. The t-test identifies viable 
comparisons of both mean values and standard deviations in the samples analysed, which 
informs how differences in both case studies are exposed in counter-terrorism.  
The one-sample t-test provides further development on how the sample data for each 
nation may be extrapolated from its population. That is to say that the main objective of 
the analysis is to test the validity and reliability of its mean value. In order to achieve this, 
the formula set out in Figure. 1 is used.   
 Fig. 1:  
 
The above algorithm is calculated dividing certain values, where x is the sample 
mean, s is the sample standard deviation of the sample and n is the sample size. 
Importantly, the mean value (x) exposes the main aim of this part of the analysis, with 
both sample mean and t-statistic37 looking for statistical significance in variation within 
the time period studied.  
                                                          
36 Inferential statistics use a form of deduction to infer facts or issues about a specific population of data, 
i.e. correlation or regression.  
37 The t-value measures the size of the difference relative to the variation in the sample data. 
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The directly comparable values exposed by t-tests provides clarity towards evaluating the 
study’s research objective; this inferential test also examines how the data is distributed 
temporally (Leiken & Brooke, 2006), again informing the study’s focus. A one sample t-
test was conducted for all counter-terrorism strategies in both national case studies, the 
UK and Spain.  
 
III. Tests of Longitude and Time-Series 
Finally, the cross-national comparison section of this study’s data analysis focuses upon 
the distribution of counter-terror strategies over a selected time period (See: sub-section 
4. 2. 1). Each counter-terrorism indicator is measured in turn, whereby time-series graphs 
are utilised to show both the distributions of police numbers, security expenditure, and 
prosecution rates in the UK and Spain. In both national case studies, the time-series is 
expressed through bar graphs (either a vertical or stacked bar graph) which demonstrate 
change over the years examined. Firstly, police numbers in the UK and Spain are 
presented using a stacked bar graph across the years 2004-2010: due to the breakdown of 
UK policing data (See: sub-section 4. 2. 2), a stacked bar graph best shows variations 
over time.       
Secondly, two time-series graphs were produced for an analysis of counter-terror 
expenditure – again, the choice for two graphs is influenced by the need to assure that the 
general assumptions for the data are met (See: sub-section 4. 2. 2). The first graphic 
depicts actual expenditure values (in millions of Pounds Sterling and Euros, respectively) 
over the years 2006-2012, which presents the case for variations between the funding of 
counter-terrorism in both nations. The second graphic alters general assumptions for the 
difference in GDP between the two nations, and identifies patterns across the 
aforementioned years according to expenditure by its proportion of national GDP – this 
helps to better identify comparisons between national spending patterns.  
Thirdly, due to the large disparities initially evident in the data between the two nations 
compared, a vertical bar graph was constructed to better visualise the two case studies to 
be compared. Furthermore, the design better suits the larger dataset: this variable 
measures temporally across the years 2006-2014. Again, there has been discussion on the 
clarity and visualisation of graphical evaluations of data, and how it is best utilised in 
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cases of year-on-year, longitudinal studies (Perer & Schneiderman, 2008). Graphics were 
decided upon as the main methods of measurement in this study’s time-series analyses.    
Importantly, this visualisation seeks to not only illustrate change over time, but to identify 
any significantly unexpected or inconsistent variations – these junctures or events will be 
identified in Chapters 6 and 7 and will allude to any explanations for such variations such 
as historically-institutionalised behaviour or decision-making.  
 
 5. 3. 2 Methodology: Comparative Analysis of Counter-Terror Indicators 
with Terrorist Attack Frequency 
I. Tests of Mean Value 
The first stage of the terrorist incidence comparative analysis employs a one sample t-test 
in order to both confirm the validity and expose any variation in mean values between the 
rates of attacks. This test contains data from attack frequency in Great Britain, Northern 
Ireland, Spain and also an EU average to provide further context. Subsequently, 
interpretations of variance and means are illustrated in order to clarify initial differences 
before further inferential analysis. This test followed the same pattern as those conducted 
for the cross-national comparatives, set out above in sub-section 5. 3. 1.  
 
II. Tests of Correlation and Association 
The second stage of analysis attempts to identify associations between attack frequency 
and each counter-terror indicator in turn, with separate analyses to be conducted for each 
nation respectively. Pearson’s Product Moment test of Correlation was applied to all 
counter-terror strategies, presented through a table matrix to demonstrate how each 
strategy and attack frequency could show association. This test expected to reveal some 
correlation in the data, including the distribution over the years studied (Perer & 
Schneiderman, 2008) – this works to support this study’s third research objective.  
Tests of correlation are generally used to identify possible associations between different 
sets of sample data or variables. Pearson’s test is measured through the r coefficient, 
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which produces a positive or negative number between 1 and 0 – this is set out using this 
study’s samples below.  The following formula calculates the Pearson r correlation.  
 Fig. 2: 
 
 
 
Figure. 2 shows how the ratio is calculated and how a correlation matrix can be formed, 
with (N) being the overall number of observations or sample data to be analysed. The sum 
of the (x) and (y) scores reveal linearity and allows for an accurate analysis of any 
association.  
Each indicator reveals a value in association with attack frequency, as well as with each 
other in turn. As mentioned above, the matrix measures values between an absolute 1 and 
0, with 1 being a positive correlation exposed, and 0 a negative correlation. The test shows 
values found between the two numbers – this could signify a relatively stronger 
association depending on how close the result is to the absolute negative or positive value.   
In the case of the UK, data from both attack frequency and counter-terror strategies are 
aggregated from Great Britain and Northern Ireland to form a single dataset for the United 
Kingdom. In order to meet general assumptions for the test, an aggregated data set is 
nonetheless required (Frey & Luechinger, 2004) – sub-section 5. 2. 1 provides scope on 
this issue both as regard how aggregation may affect the validity of the data, and the 
process of evaluating the data.    
   
III. Tests of Longitude and Time-Series 
Time-series and longitudinal graphs were applied using the same methodology outlined 
in sub-section 5. 3. 1, and follow the same methods for comparing the two parameters. In 
the following case, each counter-terror indicator are measured against terrorism incidents 
in turn, with both nations being measured separately. Following inferential analyses of 
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correlation, the time-series helps to break the statistics down to more accessible visuals – 
the comparative axis will relay both counter-terror strategies and incidences over the time 
period studied. Again, data in regards the UK were aggregated to ensure that the UK could 
be used as an individual case study to form comparisons.   
The time-series works with two axes as mentioned above – the values for counter-terror 
strategies will be shown through a bar chart, whereas the attack frequency will be exposed 
via a line graph. Both axes feature in the same graph, and also include the actual data 
values below, featured through a table to provide more exact measurements.  
 
5. 4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the above sections serve as the central methodological basis for this study, 
including the possible limitations of the process. Due to the principally quantitative nature 
of this part of the analysis, the statistical techniques employed were described and 
outlined as appropriate.  
Returning to the study’s research objectives, the tools and methods outlined above work 
to determine differences in the counter-terrorism indicators/strategies stated in the UK 
and Spain. Following this, the addition of correlating these strategies with attempted 
terrorist attacks increases the study’s research contribution, and allows for an original 
perspective on the issue. The next chapter will outline the results of this quantitative 
study.   
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                               Chapter 6: Results and Findings 
 
The intention of this chapter is to detail and explain the results achieved from the use of 
the methodological tools outlined in Chapter 4. Here, the exposition of charts, graphs and 
data will help the thesis to show how the counter-terrorism strategies focused on – police 
numbers overall, security expenditure, and prosecutions – were used by the UK and Spain 
over the time period 2005-2014. As mentioned previously, the choice of the EU’s Eurostat 
data collection to aggregate policing numbers as a counter-terror force, and its decision 
to decide how security funding is quantified, is used in this thesis due to the supranational 
institution’s objectivity in the face of any institutionalised biases.    
 
6. 1.  Cross-National Comparative of Counter-Terrorism Indicators in the UK 
and Spain.   
This sub-section shows the breakdown and comparative of three different counter-
terrorism indicators: police numbers, security expenditure, and prosecutions in the 
criminal justice system of the UK and Spain, respectively. Each indicator is analysed in 
turn, with tests of validity, mean distribution and a final time-series analysis is 
undertaken.  
 
Analysis of Police Numbers 
6. 1. 1 Distribution and Validity of Police Numbers in England38, Northern 
Ireland (NI) and Spain according to Friedman’s Two-way Analysis of 
Variance. 
In first case, and following an initial non-parametric39 examination of the data pertaining 
to police numbers in England, Northern Ireland and Spain, it was found that the 
                                                          
38 Data for Scotland was not provided to EU T-Stat, and not applied for this counter-terrorism indicator: 
thus, separate analyses were undertaken for England and Northern Ireland to provide clarity. 
39 Non-parametric tests are used when the researcher cannot assume that the data follows a specific 
distribution. 
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distributions, or frequency of occurrence, of the measured variables were equivalent. This 
was found at the p = 0.5 significance level (.001) using Friedman’s two-way analysis of 
variance, and confirms the use of this data for further inferential analysis by rejecting the 
null hypothesis.  
 
6. 1. 2 One-Sample t-tests for the distribution of Police Numbers in 
England, Northern Ireland, and Spain. 
The table below illustrates the results for a one-sample t-test conducted against the police 
number data for England, NI and Spain. All selected samples are judged to be significant 
statistically, while also presenting mean values and standard deviations (SD) over the 7-
year period analysed. In this case, the key elements of the table are both the mean values 
and the standard deviations, as both show variations across the national case studies. The 
SDs for each sample display reasonably consistent results within their populations, and 
follow similar patterns to their respective means.  
 
 Table 1: One-sample t-test of Police Number data  
 N 
(Years) 
Mean SD T-Stat df Sig. 
England 7 140976.8 1070.0 348.5 6 .00** 
Northern 
Ireland 
7 7893.0 706.2 29.5 6 .00** 
Spain 7 216547.5 1965.4 29.1 6 .00** 
 
* Data found to be significant at the p = 0.05 level 
** Data found to be significant at the p = 0.01 level 
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While the mean results differ markedly between each nation analysed, the significance (< 
.001) remains consistent – the t-statistic shows closer values between Northern Ireland 
and Spain, as opposed to England and Spain. This variation in t-value is shown most 
prominently through the large difference shown in the English data (348.5) and Spanish 
data (29.1), where mean averages are shown approximately between 140,000 in the UK 
and 210,000 in Spain – conclusions will be able to be drawn in Chapter 7 as to why this 
may be so. In this case, the years taken for analysis were 2004-2010.  
 
6. 1. 3 Time-Series Analysis of Police Numbers in UK: England, UK: 
Northern Ireland, and Spain. 
The fluctuations in policing numbers are subsequently mapped from 2004 to 2010 below, 
with colour-coding employed to aid comprehension and visibility. In blue, the variations 
in policing numbers for England are categorised under UK, as is the data in green for 
Northern Ireland; the Spanish policing data is represented in red in the stacked bar graph. 
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Graph 1: Time-series of Police Numbers in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and 
Spain 
 
 
The chart shows a clear increment in police numbers in Spain, increasing year-on-year 
from 2004. While this clarity is evident in the Spanish data, no such visual increase is 
noted in policing numbers from England or NI. This being the case, while the UK case 
study is separated into English and NI police numbers, the lack of real alteration or 
fluctuation becomes more evident – England demonstrating both small falls (2007) and 
small increases (2010); Northern Ireland, contrastingly, sees a steady decrease in 
numbers.  
 
Analysis of Security Spending and Public Safety Expense 
6. 1. 4 Distribution and Validity of Security Expense in the UK and Spain 
according to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test  
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In the second case, the initial non-parametric examination of security expenditure 
revealed that distributions were again equivalent, resulting in viability for further 
analysis. This was found at the p = .05 level (.018) using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
– this allowed the researcher to reject the null hypothesis40 and conduct further analysis 
using parametric statistical examinations in subsequent testing.  
       
6. 1. 5 One-Sample t-tests for the Distribution of Security Expenditure in 
the UK and Spain 
Below, a tabulated interpretation of analysed mean-values are shown through respective 
t-tests of security spending in the UK and Spain. Security spending is calculated based on 
all dedicated finances provided by the country in the effort to combat terrorism activity, 
according to Eurostat. The table shows both the mean values for both datasets, and also 
the validity of their respective distributions. The mean values reveal a considerable 
difference in spending, albeit within the understanding that Spain has a smaller overall 
population – the UK has 65.6 million inhabitants at the time of writing, and Spain 46.5 
million inhabitants. Thus, sub-section 6.1 also includes an examination of expenditure 
against overall GDP. In this case, the years taken for analysis were 2006-2012 
 
Table 2: One-sample t-test of Security Expenditure 
 N 
(Years) 
Mean SD T-Stat df Sig. 
UK 7 47220 2810.5 44.4 6 .00** 
Spain 7 21654 1965.4 29.1 6 .00** 
 
 
                                                          
40 The “null hypothesis” assumes that there is no statistically significant difference between the two 
analysed population samples.  
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* Data found to be significant at the p = 0.05 level 
** Data found to be significant at the p = 0.01 level 
Further to this, the ratios of standard deviation (SD) shown are more variant to the mean 
value, with the SD of the UK differing greatly. This indicates inconsistency in the 
spending patterns, but not necessarily in any specific direction. The t-stat indicates the 
variance from mean security spending in the UK and Spain – however, the data shows 
reasonable consistency with the mean to confirm a normal distribution of variance.  
  
6. 1. 6 Time-Series Analyses of Security Spending (Numeric) and per 
GDP in the UK and Spain 
A time-series analysis was levied with the purpose of illustrating change and comparisons 
over time – data retrieved both from the UK and Spain in respect to security spending. 
Graph 2 indicates the fluctuations evident in both the UK and Spain’s spending patterns 
across the years 2006-2012, showing visually apparent shifts in both nations. The UK 
saw a significant increase in funding in 2007, and then experienced relative falls in 
consequent years; comparatively, Spain oversaw a relatively consistent increase in 
funding until the year 2012, which saw a significant reduction in funding.  
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Graph 2: Time-series of Security Expenditure in the UK and Spain (by Frequency) 
 
 
Due to issues related to population differences, as considered above in sub-section 6.1.5, 
there may be significant and evident differences between the amounts spent on security – 
the UK appears to spend almost double on security year-on-year as compared to Spain. 
This fails to properly take into account the economic and GDP-based factors that could 
affect the choice by national agencies to distribute security funding. Thus, Graph 3 will 
allude to the distribution of spending in economic terms.  
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Graph 3: Time-series of Security Expenditure in the UK and Spain (by GDP) 
 
Graph 3 above proceeds to show a difference in distribution and fluctuation over time in 
real-economic terms, as opposed to the data reflected in Graph 2. The distribution 
according to year-on-year GDP per capita provides a clearer example of data 
measurements that take into account possible rationales, returning to this study’s 
discussion on observing counter-terrorism through institutions, such as the UK’s Office 
for Budget Responsibility and Exchequer. However, the corrected data alludes to a 
different pattern: the UK demonstrating a relative increase in security spending until 
2009, which subsequently sees a consistent fall until 2012. In comparison, Spain increases 
spending from 2006 until 2010 – following this, spending begins to fall.  
Graph 3 provides an entirely different picture to Graph 2 in terms of the spending 
distributions in the UK and Spain between 2006 and 2012. The importance of the 
economically-corrected data is shown through the variance in distributions in both case 
studies, in both graphs – this could suggest different research implications.  
   
Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Prosecutions (Convictions) in the UK and 
Spain 
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6. 1. 7 Distribution and Validity of Prosecution (Conviction) Data according to 
the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
Thirdly, the initial non-parametric examination of Counter-Terror prosecutions showed 
that distributions were equivalent, resulting in viability for further analysis. The data 
follows a similar temporal pattern to the previous indicators, measured above, and was 
shown to be a reliable sample. This was found at the p = .05 significance level (.011) 
using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test – this allowed the researcher to reject the null 
hypothesis and conduct further analysis.  
 
   6. 1. 8 One-sample t-tests for the Distribution of Counter-Terrorism 
Prosecutions (Convictions) in the UK and Spain 
Table 3 below measures the mean values, and distribution of such, amongst the data 
provided by counter-terrorism convictions. The mean values immediately suggest a great 
variance in conviction rates in Spain, as compared to the UK: the data suggest a mean 
value almost four times greater in Spain as opposed to the substantially smaller conviction 
rate in the UK. In this case, the years taken for analysis were 2006-2014.  
 
Table 3: One-sample t-test of Prosecutions (Convictions) 
 N 
(Years) 
Mean SD T-Stat df Sig. 
UK 9 36.2 33.6 3.2 8 .012* 
Spain 9 136.7 35.7 11.4 8 .00** 
 
* Data found to be significant at the p = 0.05 level 
** Data found to be significant at the p = 0.01 level 
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The standard deviation (SD) indicates a similar pattern of variation, distributed across the 
years of analysis for both case studies. As opposed to the disparate mean values, the SD 
in both cases are similar and show almost the same level of independent variance. This 
would appear to indicate that the significant difference in year-on-year values are 
consistent from 2006 to 2014 – Graph 4 illustrates this distribution of data more clearly.  
 
6. 1. 9 Time-Series Analysis of Prosecutions (Convictions) in the UK and 
Spain 
A time-series graphic was undertaken to show a clearer image of the distribution of values 
in prosecution rates in the UK and Spain. To this end, the same style and characteristics 
of graphic were reproduced as seen above with the previous counter-terrorism indicators. 
Below, Graph 4 demonstrates with clarity the assertions made about both the mean values 
and SD of the UK and Spain (as seen in sub-section 5. 3. 2) – with the exception of an 
outlier in 2014, the data alludes to a significantly higher conviction rate in Spain.  
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Graph 4: Time-series of Prosecutions (Convictions) in the UK and Spain 
 
The graph similarly illustrates a fairly uneven pattern of prosecution in both case studies. 
This is inconsistent with previous indicators that revealed increasing or decreasing values 
in either case study. In the case of the UK, there are some indications of directional change 
from 2011 – significant increases year-on-year show almost two-fold change. In contrast, 
Spanish data for convictions is notably erratic, albeit maintaining a high, overall rate.   
  
6. 2 Analysis and Correlations of Counter-Terrorism Indicators against 
Terrorism Attack Frequency in the United Kingdom and Spain.  
This sub-section illustrates the above analysed counter-terrorism indicators in the context 
of terrorist attack frequency in the UK and Spain. It attempts to show correlation between 
the distributions of counter-terrorism strategies and the fluctuations of attacks in the 
country. Following a test of validity, parametric correlation tests are undertaken to 
provide clarity – this is followed by subsequent time-series graphics to break down the 
correlational results further. Data for the UK is interpreted in first instance, followed by 
data retrieved for Spain. 
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         6.  2.  1 One-sample t-tests for the Distribution of Terrorist Attack Frequency 
in the UK 
In order to ensure the validity and distribution of the attack frequency data, a one-sample 
t-test was conducted. In the case of Table 4, distribution values are shown in all nations 
observed: Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and Spain – an EU average is included to 
provide a supranational perspective. In this case N equals the number of years in the 
period 2004-2014, which was measured in this analysis.   
Table 4: One-sample t-test of Attack Frequency in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, 
Spain and the EU 
 N 
(Years) 
Mean SD T-Stat df Sig. 
Great 
Britain 
(GB)41 
10 6.0 5.4 3.4 9 .007** 
Northern 
Ireland 
10 34.4 34.2 3.1 9 .011** 
Spain 10 15.5 13.2 3.71 9 .005** 
EU 
(Average) 
10 130.4 58.7 7.0 9 .000** 
 
* Data found to be significant at the p = 0.05 level 
** Data found to be significant at the p = 0.01 level 
                                                          
41 Data for England, Wales and Scotland provided for Attack Frequency Analysis. 
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The results show the mean values of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to be greatly 
different, positing possible implications for aggregation42 in later tests. The mean values 
of the Spanish data revealed it to sit significantly below an aggregated UK dataset, but 
above attacks taken place in Great Britain. The t-test additionally reveals that for the years 
analysed, Northern Ireland makes up over 10% of all attacks in the EU as a whole.    
 
6. 2.  2 Analysis of UK Correlational Data 
In order to effectively reveal correlations and patterns between the two sets of data, only 
yearly cases where both datasets possessed values were used, i.e. the years 2006-12 in the 
case of security funding were measured against the same years for attack frequency in the 
UK. Similarly, Great British and Northern Irish data was aggregated on this occasion 
across all variables to form a United Kingdom value.  As a consequence of aggregation, 
general statistical assumptions for the test had been taken into account and adjusted 
respectively, prior to its undertaking.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Aggregation is the addition or combination of datasets to facilitate variable analysis, i.e. the 
aggregation of English and Northern Irish data to form a UK variable. 
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Table 5: Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Analysis of Counter-terrorism 
Indicators in the UK 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Attack Frequency 
(UK) 
-        
2. Police Numbers 
           (UK) 
    -.006 -   
3. Security Funding 
           (UK) 
    -.553     -.332 -  
4. Prosecutions/ 
           Convictions 
           (UK) 
    -.896**    -.477    -.181 - 
     
 ** Data found to be significant at the p = 0.01 level 
The results demonstrate a varied pattern of values, with statistical significance only being 
found with the Prosecution variable – with a value close to 1, the correlation with attack 
frequency is considered extremely likely. However, the variables of security funding and 
police numbers do not possess the same amount of alignment – police numbers in 
particular appear to illustrate almost no indication of possible correlation with a value 
very close to  absolute 0. In order to see how these variables relate more visually, graphs 
below present terrorist attack frequency measured against each indicator in turn.   
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Graph 5: Time-Series of Attack Frequency and Police Numbers in the UK 
 
 
Above, Graph 5 indicates the particularly inconsistent pattern of fluctuations in both 
attack frequency and policing numbers in the UK. The large fall in police numbers, seen 
in 2007, does correlate with a rise in attacks in the same year; however this is contrasted 
by a significant increase in both attacks and policing numbers in 2010. It should be 
mentioned that this could be affected by aggregation bias in both variables’ cases43.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 See Limitations in Chapter 4.  
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Graph 6: Time-series of Attack Frequency and Security Expenditure in the UK 
 
 
 
Again, as seen in Graph 5, Graph 6 does not immediately show any visual correlation 
between the variables. However, the lack of correlation may suggest an indirect pattern 
of some consequence – from 2009, attacks increased substantially across years that saw 
a great reduction in security funding. This is contrasted again as attacks are seen rising 
from 2006-07, with funding also increasing in turn, indicating a similar association 
between the variables in the UK.    
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Graph 7: Time-series of Attack Frequency and Prosecutions (Convictions) in the 
UK 
 
 
Prosecutions, measured as successful convictions in this case, resulted as the only value 
deemed statistically significant in the analysis. This can also be observed in the time-
series above, as fluctuations and movements of both prosecution rate and attack frequency 
are largely similar.  
Graph 7 alludes to a more consistently distributed correlation between both prosecutions 
and terrorist attack frequency in the UK. As mentioned above, this works in support of 
Table 5, which showed this to also be statistically significant – the potential relationships 
between prosecutions, convictions and attack frequency will be outlined and explained in 
Chapter 6.  
The UK data demonstrates a largely inconsistent relationship between police numbers, 
security spending and terrorist attack frequency, for the most part. Measuring prosecution 
data as an indicator for counter-terrorism strategy revealed a very clear correlation with 
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attacks in the UK: the importance of what divergence or association in the above analyses 
suggests is a subject for this work’s discussion.  
 
6.  2. 3 Analysis of Spanish Correlational Data  
Following the same method employed with the data from counter-terrorism indicators 
and terrorist attack frequency in the UK, a Pearson’s Product-Moment correlational 
analysis is undertaken – this is followed by a time-series, again projected through coded 
graphs.  
 
Table 6: Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Analysis of Counter-terrorism 
Indicators in Spain 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Attack Frequency 
(Spain) 
-    
2. Police Numbers 
           (Spain) 
   -.496 -   
3. Security Funding 
           (Spain) 
   -.384    -.662 -  
4. Prosecutions/ 
           Convictions 
           (Spain) 
   -.014    -.313    -.497 - 
 
Table 6 demonstrates a similar pattern of associations between counter-terror strategies 
and attack frequency in Spain. In regard to police numbers and security funding, the level 
of association observed appears closer to the 0.5 ratio – this indicates that there is neither 
a positive or negative correlation found, suggesting no observable connection between 
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attacks and these indicators. The value observed between prosecutions and terrorist attack 
frequency is shown to be almost 0, which indicates a negative association – importantly 
for his study, this association has implications for its research questions relating to cross-
national comparisons between the UK and Spain. This will be further discussed in the 
next chapter, as this data in Spain works directly in contrast to the same data found in the 
UK.  
Below, the results are shown graphically, with identifying patterns observed between the 
variables compared in Spain. Possible implications and issues within the data can be 
better observed through this method, identifying fluctuations not seen when tabulated.  
 
Graph 8: Time-series of Attack Frequency and Police Numbers in Spain 
 
 
Graph 8 better illustrates how the association of police numbers and attack frequency is 
limited: there is no discernible pattern in any year measured, with policing numbers 
gradually increasing year-on-year and attacks fluctuating without consistency. Overall, 
there is a very limited picture presented in either statistical or graphical terms from this 
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section of analysis – while this is the case, the lack of a clear correlation or association 
does not mean that there are no possible applications of this counter-terrorism strategy, 
simply that none are observable statistically in this case.  
   
Graph 9: Time-series of Attack Frequency and Security Expenditure in Spain 
 
 
Similarly, Graph 9 presents a fairly consistent increase in security funding over the period 
2006-2012 without a clear pattern of association observed between terrorist attacks and 
this spending growth. The year 2010 sees a drop to almost zero in terms of attacks year-
on-year – however this can’t necessarily be associated with increased spending, based on 
this evidence.  
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Graph 10: Time-series of Attack Frequency and Prosecutions (Convictions) in 
Spain 
 
 
 
Initial observation reveals a negative association between the two variables, confirming 
visually the statistical inference made in Table 6 – 2008 shows a large increase in attacks, 
while prosecutions actually fell by half. Overall, Graph 10 shows a substantial 
discrepancy between the numbers of people convicted for terrorism offences in Spain, 
against the quantity of attempted or successful attacks in the country.  
Unlike the statistically significant values noted in Table 5 with regard to prosecutions and 
attack frequency in the UK, the sheer contrast in situation observed in Spain indicates a 
number of underlying factors to be studied.  
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6. 3 Conclusion 
The results of this study posit a number of possible implications for inference and further 
study, and will be evaluated in Chapter 6. The cross-national comparison of counter-terror 
indicators reveals some indications of similarity and divergence – while patterns of 
policing numbers and funding are reasonably similar between both nations, prosecutions 
are notably different, with huge divergences observed across nearly all years measured. 
Moreover, the results have had implications for the cross-national comparison element of 
this study’s focus, with divergences being notable across all three counter-terrorism 
strategies.  
Analyses using terrorist attack frequency show a similar inconsistency when compared to 
each indicator in turn – police numbers and funding evidence certain associations in 
respect to certain years of attacks. However, again, the most notable correlations are 
validated in respect to prosecution rates: in terms of the study’s research questions, 
contrasts observed between the two nations are both statistically and visually clear, and 
could even be used to give quantitative evidence of many of the historical elements 
alluded to previously.  
Overall, the results have shown: 
 A limited statistical or graphical picture in regard to policing numbers, both in 
terms of their changes in both case studies, and when associated with attacks. 
 A mixed statistical and graphical picture in regard to security expenditure, 
whereby little change of note was seen in case study comparisons, and some 
association found when correlated with attacks. 
 A stark difference statistically and graphically was found between the way 
prosecutions were used in the UK and Spain, and this was only confirmed further 
when correlated with attacks. A significant pattern of convictions and attacks were 
seen in the UK, while the Spanish case study saw inflated conviction numbers 
irrespective of attack frequency. 
Chapter 7 will underline any implications of the results observed above, using literature 
and historically-institutionalised theory that can be applied to the evidence. The 
discussion will attempt to find connections and test assumptions made in this study’s 
research questions. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
7. 1 Introduction 
This study has set its focus on comparing and analysing the different counter-terrorism 
strategies and employment methods used by two European countries: the UK and Spain. 
It covers an analysis of the legislative and political architectures used to circumvent the 
threat of terrorism within a historical institutionalist perspective44 - this culminates in a 
quantitative interpretation of actual counter-terror strategies to inform comparatives 
between both national approaches, and their impact (or lack thereof) on terrorist attacks. 
Naturally, while terrorism is the central focus of this work, such architectures affect a 
multitude of other security issues and criminal offences. Results observed in Chapter 6 
require evaluation based on both evidence of previous research and also the author’s 
interpretation of counter-terrorism strategic interactions between the two nations studied.   
The literature to be included in this discussion aims to offer support to the research 
conducted; similarly, the limitations of relevant research lead the researcher to consider 
a number of further hypothetical considerations for the results. Thus, it is important to re-
visit the work’s purpose – the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 were the following: 
1. What were the major differences/similarities between the counter-terror 
approaches of the UK and Spain in the period 2004-2014? 
2. Have historical events had an impact on the way in which the UK and Spain 
determine their counter-terrorism strategies?  
3. Has attack frequency changed as a consequence?  
 
This chapter uses these questions as the basis for the measurement of the results observed 
in Chapter 5, and the theoretical and legal issues derived from Chapter 4. The discussion 
is separated into two sub-sections, which deals with each research question in turn – the 
initial cross-national comparative will be looked at in sub-section 7. 2, and each indicator 
as compared to terrorist attack incidents in the UK and Spain is evaluated in sub-section 
7. 3. 
                                                          
44 See Chapter 4. 
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7. 2 Comparison of Counter-Terror Indicators in the UK and Spain 
This study’s quantitative assessment of counter-terror strategies and indicators in the UK 
and Spain employed a number of parametric, statistical tests of mean variance and 
distribution, which were followed by time-series graphs. The results of each counter-
terrorism strategy (indicator) will be studied in turn.  
 
 7. 2. 1 Discussion of Police Numbers in the UK and Spain 
In the first case, the analysis of police numbers has revealed some variance in the 
countries’ police numbers: the division of Great British numbers and Northern Irish 
numbers assisted to confirm that the UK is valid as a consistent case study. Hence, as 
revealed in the time-series, both the Great British and Northern Irish police numbers did 
not reveal any clear discrepancy between the two territories. When compared to the steady 
increase in policing numbers in Spain, the UK territories show clear stability – both Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland contrast markedly to the visual increment in Spain, as seen 
in Graph 1. Again, due to the choice to look at police numbers universally, particularly 
as most police officers in some manner of speaking work to prevent terrorism from its 
initial stages, any divergence could be the cause of numerous external factors.  
Glomseth and Gottschalk (2009) present an argument of multi-faceted cultures in 
counter-terrorism policing, relating directly to the results on police numbers and also 
institutionalism in its counter-terrorism strategy. The cultural dynamics behind counter-
terrorism policing can differ in European nations – as shown by Glomseth and Gottschalk 
(2009: 4), occupational culture can be both a force for change in British counter-terror 
policing, and also a cause for maintaining the current strategy. This could also be 
indicative of actual numbers, which showed that over the period 2004-2010, police 
numbers in the UK did not increase in any substantial way. In contrast, Spanish police 
numbers revealed a continuous increase over the period studied, which could infer a 
cultural, and even a historically-institutional, difference in approach to dealing with not 
just counter-terrorism, but security as a whole.  
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Issues of cultural, institutional and strategic difference have been studied within the 
context of European nations (Behr, 2007; Argomaniz, 2009; Busuioc et al., 2011) – 
consistencies or divergences in policing recruitment may have a number of theoretical 
foundations in the counter-terrorism context. As evidenced in Graph 1 in Section 5.1.3, 
police numbers in Northern Ireland proceeded to decrease (albeit gradually) over the 
years analysed, which is of particular interest to the region’s historical experience with 
counter-terrorism. It is also possible to position the study’s institutional considerations 
within the study of police numbers, as the creation of JTAC (See: Chapter 4) may 
influence the need for extra officers/security officials, or the displacement of them. 
Difficulty in breaking down security officer numbers would make this analysis difficult 
(See discussion in Chapter 5: Limitations), but should be considered nonetheless. 
A reduction in numbers could be indicative of economic factors (Caruso & Schneider, 
2011) that exist outside of the control of typical counter-terror architectures, however the 
lack of movement in Great Britain points to differing approaches to the importance of 
policing in both territories. The multi-faceted nature of policing and its changes could be 
due to the influences of privatisation or domestic agendas – however, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the choice by the EU’s security architecture to look at police numbers 
universally was replicated here in order to corroborate both the actual data sources and 
the validity of how the EU is collecting said data.   
 
 7. 2. 2 Discussion of Security Expenditure in the UK and Spain 
Secondly, the analysis conducted using data from counter-terrorism security expenditure 
suggested a mixed picture: while there is a visual consistency viewed in Graph 2 between 
the investment in security by the UK and Spain, the actual values do not follow any 
distinct patterns. Similarly, the mean values and overall distributions are not indicative of 
clear, directional change – in contrast, according to the EU’s paper for security budgeting 
(Europa, 2015), the Union’s commission increased the funding of its central counter-
terrorism force, Europol, from 53 million (Euros) to 68 million (Euros) in the years, 2002-
2009. Eurostat’s consideration of what constitutes security expenditure was aggregated 
across the overall budget, from intelligence to armed enforcement, and any operation that 
can be attributed to public order and safety funding, including counter-terrorism.     
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Questions regarding the creation of comparative parameters in counter-terror indicators 
face the issue of variances in national populations (as seen in the case of police numbers) 
and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The latter is an issue which was mediated in the 
statistical analysis of counter-terror security spending, whereby a secondary time-series 
was produced in Graph 3 – this is particularly important considering the numerous 
categories included in the EU’s aggregation of this data. When conditions were met to 
consider spending in accordance with GDP, consistent increases in funding were 
observed until 2009, whereby both nations saw steady falls. Incidentally, this returns the 
argument to the same issue raised in sub-section 6.2.1 – economic factors have shown to 
be a factor in the discussion of both terrorist activity and counter-terrorism more generally 
(Barros et al., 2006).  
Considering data analysis with the theory derived in Chapter 4, GDP conditions would 
suggest historically-institutionalised consistencies within the case studies, particularly in 
terms of how security expenditure forms part of each nation’s overall spending. The study 
has shown that economic factors, referring to the crisis of 2008, may have impacted upon 
counter-terrorism spending which, after successive increases previously, are indicative of 
market-led influence. This is supported by the critical juncture theory, which can be 
applied to issues beyond either terrorism incidents – economic events are equally as 
critical in causing change to strategy or approach. Institutions, thus, may reflect the 
changing nature of security expenditure, most particularly in the UK where institutional 
architectures can be more clearly seen than in Spain.  
Here, institutions such as British and Spanish security services may well be financed in 
accordance with junctures outside of purely terror-related events, which implies a need 
for a multi-faceted study of rationales for this. Additionally, what has been discussed with 
regard to institutions related to the financial nature of UK and Spanish counter-terrorism 
is related: as mentioned previously in Chapter 4, the UK’s creation of the Office for 
Budget Responsibility fits appropriately in the time frame of this study. Importantly, it 
also provides further support for the contrast between the UK’s approach to using its 
institutions, and the static approach administered by Spain in terms of its financial 
distribution for security purposes.       
Continuing with this idea, the data raises possibilities of further, non-security-based 
considerations of how expenditure may fluctuate over time. Alongside this, whereas the 
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Office for Budget Responsibility can provide analysis on UK security financing and any 
incremental change therein, the Spanish finance ministry does not release information on 
its decision-making or its advisory bodies. In particular, economic and financial rationales 
are most clearly raised by Graph 345, which allude to the possibility of national budgetary 
conditions playing a significant role in the decision to increase finance for counter-
terrorism in both nations. This could also include political or electoral dynamics, or the 
outsourcing or such functions to private actors. All such issues illustrate possible 
institutional divergence in national terms within the counter-terror context.   
Contrarily, this works against the idea that terrorist attacks induce a kneejerk reaction to 
increase funding due to public fear (NATO Review, 2008) – there is a clear absence in 
consensus of motivation for increasing or decreasing security funding. This has been 
supported through claims that counter-terrorism exists as a form of political and security 
theatre (Dixon, 2014), which endorses funding increases and justifies the institutional 
focus of the study through the influence of security services viewing historical events as 
backing for increased budgets.  
 
7. 2. 3 Discussion of Prosecutions (Convictions) of Terrorism in the UK and 
Spain 
In the third case, the study focussed on counter-terror prosecution rates in the UK and 
Spain, and how variations in both the process and use of the criminal justice system in 
the respective nations may be utilised to a greater or lesser degree. The values 
extrapolated from the raw data revealed a substantial difference in the use of prosecutions 
as a counter-terrorism strategy: the huge divergence found in mean values – with an 
average of almost 100 more cases found in Spain – suggests a significantly alternative 
approach to using the criminal justice system in Spain to the approach utilised in the UK. 
The time-series analysis revealed that this difference was just as stark visually, with 
nearly every year seeing at least two-times higher values in Spain than the UK.  
                                                          
45 Graph 3 revealed 2009 to be the key year in terms of reducing counter-terror and security financing – 
this same year is largely considered to be the first, complete year of Economic-induced crisis in Europe 
(Lane, 2012).  
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There is very limited research explaining this divergence – cross-national comparatives 
within European counter-terrorism frameworks are rare generally. Regarding the question 
of using prosecutions as a counter-terrorism indicator, Van de Linde et al. (2002) 
emphasise the strong relationship between the USA and the UK in terms of the 
investigation and prosecution of counter-terror offences. Similarly, the specific 
legislation designed for terrorism offence in the UK (see: Appendix A) may point to the 
lower conviction rates, although this should be considered within the different judicial 
systems employed and varying burdens of proof. The role of EU institutions in 
combatting a historically-motivated approach to using the criminal justice system could 
be evermore important in this debate (Monar, 2014b)   
Spanish prosecution cases illustrate a starkly different picture – the hugely disparate rates 
of convictions could be endemic of a number of factors. While the UK possesses 
individual pieces of legislation in relation to terrorism, Spain merely expands and 
enhances constitutional acts already in place (Van de Linde, 2002: 97). This is politically 
vague, and could lead to a variety of crimes being prosecuted under ambiguous terrorism 
legislation, in both case studies: Spain’s ETA-centric counter-terrorism focus (Barros, 
2003; Argomaniz & Vidal-Diez, 2009; Alonso, 2013) is as much a political mechanism 
as a security issue. Specifically, this study has revealed through this particular statistical 
examination that the state of criminal convictions differs greatly between the two nations, 
possibly indicating as to a deliberate attempt to increase conviction rates more generally. 
Furthermore, returning to the notion of historically institutionalised issues playing a role 
in interpreting the counter-terrorism strategies of the UK and Spain, the notable 
divergence may support the study’s previous suggestions of contrasting political attitudes, 
such as the issue of the national constitution (see: Chapter 4), and approaches to security 
in the 20th Century. This is opposed to the critical juncture paradigm discussed by the 
likes of Thelen (1999) and Wolff (2009), which would have grouped the terrorism events 
of 2004 and 2005 in Spain and the UK respectively, together.  
While these junctures must be considered important in the counter-terrorism dynamic, 
sufficient data exists here to show that the criminal justice system was applied markedly 
differently despite both nations experiencing a similar attack, by the same perpetrator46 
in the space of a year. Moreover, it exposes the criminal justice system as a complex 
                                                          
46 Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for both attacks. 
103 
 
institution that is used for the benefit of a number of non-security focussed paradigms, 
including partisan political gain. 
Unlike the inconsistent patterns and comparative mechanism observed between the UK 
and Spain’s policing numbers and security funding, prosecution rates present further 
implications for investigation and discussion, comparatively.  
 
7. 3 Counter-Terror Indicators as compared against Attack Frequency in the 
UK and Spain 
The results evidenced in Chapter 5 alluded to a range of inconsistent patterns and 
variables in the comparison of counter-terrorism indicators in the UK and Spain. The 
second objective of this research was to consider these indicators and strategies in the 
context of terrorism incidents in both nations.  
 
7. 3. 1 Discussion of Attack Frequency vs. Counter-Terrorism Strategies in 
the UK 
The results relating to the cross-analysis between terrorist incidents and counter-terror 
strategy in the UK yielded a number of points for investigation, through both the study’s 
correlational and time-series graphical analyses.  
Police numbers, when associated with attack incidence in the UK, alluded to a very 
limited relationship in statistical significance. However, Graph 5 shows an increase in 
attacks when police numbers fall across most of the years studied; similarly showing the 
reverse to be true also. The pattern of attacks are largely inconsistent however, and could 
be implicit of other motivations, rather than the result of this counter-terrorism strategy. 
Most importantly, the researcher learns that while increased policing may have profound 
effects on deterrence across many tenets of terrorism activity, direct association with 
reducing attacks was not shown.  
Interestingly, attacks were shown to increase significantly from the year 2009 in the UK 
– sub-section 6.2.2 revealed that when analysed against GDP values, counter-terror 
funding decreased in the UK in that same period. This clear divergence was not confirmed 
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statistically (with no clear, significant correlation observed), which contrasts with the 
claims of Danzell and Zidek (2013) whom identify a negative correlation between the 
reduction of attacks and increased funding. Their study focussed upon funding for the 
Metropolitan Police service – that is to say, the increase in funding did result in an overall 
reduction of attacks. This thesis took the decision to go further and included not only a 
cross-national comparative but showed an aggregation of all funding attributed to national 
counter-terrorism. 
The rate of prosecutions, when compared to terrorist attacks in the UK, demonstrated a 
far clearer association – results revealed that attacks and prosecutions were consistent 
across nearly every year, indicating that the criminal justice system was possibly utilised 
as a response to attacks, as opposed to a preventative mechanism. In being statistically 
significant (Table 5), the positive relationship between both variables supports the 
hypothesis that the UK uses legislation as a direct response to terror, again supported by 
Van de Linde et al. (2002)’s post-9/11 work on initial counter-terrorism strategies. 
However, this study again develops this analysis further – Van de Linde et al.’s work did 
not postulate any theoretical rationale for this, whereas this thesis has suggested the 
constitutional and historically-institutionalised effects of national politics and critical 
junctures to be significant in supporting the statistical inferences found.  
 
 7. 3. 2 Discussion of Attack Frequency vs. Counter-Terrorism Strategies in 
Spain 
Turning the study’s focus to the Spanish case-study, police numbers were compared to 
the quantity of terrorism incidents in the nation. Both the analysis of correlation and the 
time-series graph failed to illustrate a tangible relationship between the two variables, 
which implies that the gradual increase of police numbers through the years 2004-2010 
were not found to be related to the incidence of terrorism in Spain. While the lack of 
association between terrorist incidents and increasing police numbers is confirmed, there 
are research implications suggested by the continuous appreciation in police numbers in 
spite of incident changeability. Notably, the decision taken to analyse based on terrorism 
events is not able to take into account other probable results from increasing or decreasing 
105 
 
police numbers, particularly those issues for which data is difficult to retrieve, i.e. 
prevention of terrorist radicalisation. 
In relation to the issue of security spending in Spain, as incidents decreased significantly, 
funding also decreased over the same period. Returning to Danzell and Zidek (2013)’s 
work, which states that a negative correlation is found between attack frequency and 
counter-terrorism spending in case studies, including Spain, this works in support of this 
study’s findings – across the years 2008-2012, attacks fell as funding increased. However, 
in the two years previous to this, there was no association observed, which could imply 
that the years chosen for study in the above paper may not identify the outlying 
inconsistencies – more complete publication of data by EURO-STAT may provide further 
data to confirm this47.     
The Spanish case of counter-terror prosecutions has already demonstrated significant 
room for interpretation. When compared to terrorism incidents over the years 2006-2014, 
prosecutions observed little relationship with attack frequency – convictions remains 
elevated despite attacks reducing to 0 in the year 2011. The implications for this variation 
could be substantial: the lack of incidents raises the question of how crimes are being 
designated and defined under the Spanish criminal justice system. Returning to Appendix 
A, there is no legislative change between 2006 and 2014 that informs the rationale for 
such an over-zealous approach to counter-terror prosecution, pointing to alternative uses 
of the Spanish Criminal Code (Código Penal). Further research into the application of 
legal and criminal mechanics in Spain would reveal how Articles 571-580 of the Criminal 
Code are applied.      
  
7. 4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of this study have provided perspective on both the comparative 
nature of cross-national analysis in the context of counter-terrorism strategies, and also 
the association of said strategies upon terrorism incidence. The decision by Spain to 
continue increasing police numbers in spite of falling terrorism incidence works contrary 
to the UK’s inconsistent recruitment policy. Oscillating security expenditure is shown in 
both nations, but also derives from the idea that expenditure is influenced by the quantity 
                                                          
47 See: Chapter 5.2.2 Limitations.  
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of attacks – thus it is altered reactively, rather than pre-emptively. Finally, the huge 
variation noted in prosecution rates is indicative of how the criminal justice system may 
be applied to terrorism cases in Spain, as opposed to the UK: this opens up the case for 
further research into Spain’s application of its legal system in security cases.  
The measurement and comparison of counter-terrorism strategy is most generally 
undertaken with the purpose of examining success – in counter-terrorism terms, success 
can only be considered by the reduction or elimination of terrorism incidents. Lum (2006) 
makes the claim that the absence of proper evaluation on counter-terrorism strategy, 
across an international spectrum, is endemic. Returning to the study’s theoretical 
underpinning, the importance of observing such strategies through institutions and their 
behaviours is important, as the experiences of individual nations may be too variant for 
international comparison. 
Furthermore, Lum et al. (2006) found that of the relatively little research that had taken 
place, counter-terrorism strategies were almost always unable to demonstrate 
effectiveness – possibly even resulting counter-productive. Again, a historical 
institutionalist perspective sheds some light on this, as effectiveness can also be relative 
to how institutions view success and failure; similarly, historical nuances may allow 
countries such as the UK and Spain to perceive the success of a strategy such as increasing 
police numbers in different ways.  
Furthermore, while the results of this study indicate a number of possible quantitative 
implications for the impact of counter-terrorist strategy in the UK and Spain, evaluation 
by comparing incidences of terrorism reflect the difficulty of making assumptions as to 
the success of counter-terrorism’s employment. Spencer (2006; 2007) criticises the 
largely rationalist approaches to measuring the above indicators of counter-terrorism, and 
posits possible alternative methods to those commonly used, i.e. quantitative analysis of 
incidences or cost-benefit calculations. Such critiques identify issues with this 
investigative approach, but lack the validity of identifying associations between both 
intra-national models, and relationships among different strategies.   
This study has presented arguments for the validity of testing counter-terror strategies 
across historically-similar nations, both considering preliminary theory and legal remits. 
It has served to illustrate trends and patterns within the issue of counter-terrorism, 
personified by the range of results produced within legal frameworks and historically-
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institutionalised rationales. These results have derived conclusions on how each indicator 
could be used – implicit issues with the decision to change or vary each strategy in turn 
will be brought up in Chapter 7 through considerations of possible future research.  
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         Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This study has attempted to show both the historically-similar experiences of the UK and 
Spain in their respective fights with terrorism, alongside how counter-terror indicators 
can be measured and strategies analysed within a theoretical/legal context. This has in 
turn considered that prevention and prosecution can allude to different challenges for 
security forces, which cannot necessarily be achieved under any one blanket strategy.   
Moreover, the decision to elect the likes of policing numbers, spending and prosecutions 
as counter-terror indicators was taken by the researcher to provide an original perspective 
on the above difficulty: as noted before in this study, there is no clear definition available 
as to what constitutes counter-terrorism strategy, and this issue can inform further study 
in itself. The evaluation of counter-terrorism strategies helps to derive conclusions on 
both prevention and prosecution; the use of public-access indicators of counter-terrorism 
facilitates a more rounded understanding of how the public can view the security process. 
This links back to the study’s discussion on the role of key institutions such as the 
Criminal Justice System, whereby its importance in assessing counter-terror architectures 
cannot be understated.  
Overall, the study has revealed a range of similarities and contradictions in approaches 
between the UK and Spain, detailing in part how two nations with such similar historical 
experiences in nationalist terrorism can react to contemporary threats, such as the critical 
junctures in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The study’s research questions propose that 
divergences in counter-terrorism approaches may be found in the two case studies, and 
while this was not universally true, the results demonstrated how institutionalised policy-
making may have inhibited the way the criminal justice system was used as a counter-
terrorism strategy.  
 
8. 1 Key Findings 
The principal aim of this thesis was to measure and evaluate the counter-terrorism 
approaches chosen for measurement, and subsequently employed in the UK and Spain. 
These indicators were looked at within the time scale of approximately 10 years, from 
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2004 to 2014. Importantly, legislative and theoretical considerations were also looked at, 
alluding to a degree of historical inconsistency on the parts of both nations, despite their 
comparability, best seen in light of revelations in policing, and financial and justice-based 
institutions.  
Through a measurement and comparison of legislation and legal reforms, counter-
terrorism strategy was adapted differently in both nations. The UK showed a far clearer 
picture in regards to how pieces of security legislation could be used to inform counter-
terrorism strategy – particularly noted was the increased focus on data retention and 
improved use of the criminal justice system. Spain’s limited use of ad hoc legislation to 
inform its approaches was found to be indicative of certain, historically-institutionalised 
issues that were similarly demonstrated in the quantitative element of this study’s 
analysis. The relationship between relevant UK institutions and the counter-terror 
indicators analysed demonstrated how such a focus was difficult in the Spanish case, and 
a constitutionally-centred framework was required to evaluate quantitative results.      
Referring back to this quantitative analysis, key findings included the statistically 
significant results indicated in both the parameters for security spending and prosecution 
rates in the UK and Spain. It was discovered that while spending showed significant 
association with the prevalence of attacks in the UK, this same correlation was not seen 
in Spain. Again, a similar contrast was seen through the use of prosecutions: the UK saw 
both prosecutions and attacks fall in tandem, however Spanish prosecutions continued to 
rise unabated despite a fall in attacks. Hence, this thesis’ contribution to knowledge comes 
principally from the main divergences found in data from strong correlations in security 
funding within the UK, and unexplained patterns in data in the Spanish use of the criminal 
justice system.   
Returning to the study’s research aims and contribution, the study has found that the three 
key indicators (police numbers, security funding, and prosecution rates) produced 
contrasting results in terms of comparing both case studies, and in any association with 
attacks. The literature has, by and large, confirmed this mixed picture (Van de Linde et 
al. 2002; Lister & Otero-Iglesias, 2012), with Foley (2013) positioning the debate firmly 
within the theoretical discussion of “inherited ideas”. This last point links well to this 
thesis’ considering historical intuitionalism as its framework for evaluating counter-terror 
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indicators, with British institutions comparatively adaptable when viewed alongside 
constitutionally-rigid Spanish institutionalism.   
 
8. 2 Further Research 
This work has provided some room for further research through its focus on counter-
terrorism indicators that are not traditionally examined. Further development could thus 
be undertaken looking at each strategy in turn.  
 Police Numbers 
While this study looked at counter-terrorism policing numbers on a purely quantitative 
level, other options could include interviews or discourse analysis to produce a more 
qualitative approach to understanding the decision-making behind the use of this 
particular counter-terrorism strategy. While looking at police numbers involved in 
counter-terrorism can be useful on its own, further evaluations of individual strategies 
(such as official rank) employed by different forces of the police could also serve to show 
both effectiveness and possible homogeneity. As mentioned previously (See: sub-section 
5. 2. 2), the decision to group policing numbers could be adapted in further research, were 
the data on the breakdown of Spanish policing into elite units to become available.  
 Security Expenditure 
Similarly to the case above, the largely quantitative nature of studying how counter-
terrorism expenditure fluctuated in both the UK and Spain could be expanded to include 
factors such as economic and policy-driven issues. As alluded to previously in the 
literature, connections between investment in security and economic variations can 
influence how counter-terrorism can be undertaken (Caruso & Schneider, 2011) – 
particularly in reference to how financial crises could have impacted the architectures 
within which counter-terrorism operates.    
 Prosecutions 
Prosecutions provided arguably the most valuable results in this study as to deriving clear 
strategic differences between the UK and Spain – however there is space to consider 
further research into possible reforms and revisions into how the criminal justice system 
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operationalises its own counter-terrorism strategy. This could be achieved through an in-
depth cross-national comparison study of counter-terrorism justice, looking at any 
nuances between both nations and judging their effectiveness, beyond just prosecution 
rate. Similarly, breaking down the institutionalisation of the Criminal Justice System 
would aid research into which features are most malleable in a counter-terror context.  
Further to the actual indicators investigated in this thesis, the case studies could be 
expanded to include other European countries and their experiences. Recent coverage of 
incidents in France, Germany and Belgium could provide scope for a pan-European 
institutional approach to counter-terrorism, with work conducted by the likes of Foley 
(2013) providing the basis for this through UK-Franco comparatives. Similarly, the future 
role of the UK48 within the dynamics of European security will also need to be examined. 
Furthermore, and returning to the historical institutionalist approach considered, a pan-
European study would involve looking at whether the institution of the European Union 
can deal with the vastness of experience accrued by up to 27 nations, particularly in 
respect to the historical disagreements between them.     
Sufficient literature already exists detailing the practice, strategies and legislative 
processes undertaken by the USA, and thus although further comparative research would 
have some benefits for academic understanding, inter-European modelling and 
comparisons have greater value in both determining cultural nuances in security policy – 
also, institutionalised processes, such as policy-making, have shown to be markedly 
different in some European cases and warrant further study.  
 
8. 3 Implications for the Debate on Counter-Terrorism 
Holistically, the results of this thesis suggest direct contributions to the academic debate 
on counter-terrorism, particularly in relation to satisfying need for more cross-national 
comparatives and identifying possible counter-terror indicators. The paradigms exhibited 
by both nations in their respective approaches result in significant theoretical and 
empirical implications. 
                                                          
48 See: Chapter 4, sub-section 4.2.2 
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These important divergences found in the results help to inform the idea that historically 
motivated rationales, such as those seen in perceptions of “critical junctures”, i.e. the 11-
M bombings in Madrid and the 7/7 bombings in London respectively; or the application 
of constitutional law, may influence the way that contemporary counter-terrorism strategy 
is used and implemented. Viewing events through the perspective of institutions allows 
counter-terrorism strategies to be analysed in their context of their undertakers, alongside 
their designers – that is to say, viewing process as well as policy.  
Similarly the aforementioned concern of “sticky” (Wolff, 2009) institutions were most 
present in Spain, with this rigidity strengthened by constitutional inflexibility. Security 
institutions in the UK, such as JTAC, presented the opposite picture. While counter-terror 
operations in Spain remain with larger bodies such as the national police and the Guardia 
Civil, the UK has shown to be open to operationalising smaller institutions in its efforts 
to combat the threat.     
The thesis’ most significant contribution to this debate was both the temporal and 
statistical evidence shown by conviction rates, revealing significant differences found 
between the UK and Spain and in terms of each nation’s use of the criminal justice system 
to prevent, and in response to, attacks.    
 
8. 4 Conclusion 
As a rule, the study of counter-terrorism is generally fraught with difficulties as to what 
is considered an effective strategy, and what can be defined as counter-terrorism in the 
first place (Hoffman, 2002). The problems raised by this are present in this research, and 
should not be trivialised in their importance to academic study. Evaluating the 
prominence or occurrence of terrorism is a comparably easier task as much study works 
reactively as opposed to pre-emptively. 
The naturally delicate nature of counter-terrorism makes research a somewhat difficult 
task in light of the increase in international terrorist activity in Europe. While this does 
result in a real need for research and analysis, particularly in prevention, counter-terrorism 
practice remains the dominion of government and security agencies, which may diminish 
the role of academia. This is not suggesting that academia is irrelevant to counter-
terrorism decision-making; instead collaboration and information-sharing should be 
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increased (Sageman, 2014), perhaps alluding to a future nexus between security 
practitioners and academics.   
As a whole, the picture displayed by this research has a relatively political dimension, 
and has observed the importance of understanding changes in legislation and policy. 
Counter-terrorism strategy is not independent of political interference, and anything from 
policing to funding is affected by legislative action. In the cases studied here, the UK and 
Spain have illustrated this point well, alluding to contrasting political attitudes to 
countering terrorism – fundamentally different approaches to defeating terrorism, while 
working within the same supranational institution, may not produce similar, effective 
results.  
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List of Abbreviations 
 
EC  European Commission 
EU  European Union 
ETA  Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
 FDCT Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism 
 GBTA Group-Based Trajectory Analysis 
 GDP  Gross-Domestic Product 
GTD  Global Terrorism Database 
 (P)IRA (Provisional) Irish Republican Army 
 ISIL  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
 ITERATE International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorism Events  
JTAC Joint-Terrorism Analysis Centre 
NCIS  National Criminal Intelligence Service 
PNR  Passenger Name Record 
SD  Standard Deviation 
TE-SAT EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 
 TFTP  Terrorist Financial Tracking Programme 
 UK  United Kingdom 
 USA  United States of America 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix (A): Legislation and Counter-Terrorism Policy Initiatives 
TE-SAT 
EUROPOL 
Significant 
legislative 
amendments. 
UK SPAIN FRANCE BELGIUM 
2014 Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers 
Act 2014 – renewal 
of previous act on 
data retention, 
obliging companies 
to keep data for 
minimum of 12 
months.  
 
 
 
_____________
_ 
Criminal Code, Code 
of Criminal 
Procedure and 
Administrative 
provisions – 
Introduction of new 
law to penalise 
creation and 
planning of attacks; 
faster exchange of 
info between forces.  
 
____________ 
2013 Justice and Security 
Act 2013 
The Act provides for 
strengthened 
oversight of 
intelligence and 
security by 
expanding the 
statutory remit of 
the Intelligence and 
Security Committee 
to include (i) a role 
in overseeing the 
wider government 
intelligence 
community and (ii) 
retrospective 
oversight of the 
operational activities 
of the agencies on 
matters of 
significant national 
interest. 
 
_____________
_ 
 
_______________
___ 
Amendments to 
Article 137 –  
Persecution of 
recruitment for 
terrorism; spreading 
of “hate”; providing 
instruction or 
training for 
terrorism; receipt of 
training.  
2012  
_______________
_______ 
 
___________ 
 
_______________
_____ 
 
_______________
_____ 
2011  
_______________
_______ 
 
___________ 
 
_______________
_____ 
DNA Law of 2011 – 
Terrorism has been 
inserted in relation 
to adding the profile 
of convicted 
persons to the 
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database of 
convicted persons. 
2010  
_______________
__________ 
Organic Law 5 of 
2010 – 
Significant law 
that ignores 
“statute of 
limitations” if 
incident has 
fatalities; 
Comprehensive 
definition of 
membership to a 
terror 
organisation; 
Now punishable: 
financing, 
promotion, 
participation; 
Recruitment and 
training more 
clearly defined.   
 
_______________
____ 
 
_______________
_____ 
2009     
2008   Article 421-422 of 
Penal Code re-
enshrined.  
 
2007 Update of: 
Terrorism Act 
2006/2007 
An extension of pre-
charge detention for 
terrorist suspects 
beyond the current 
limit of 28 days; a 
requirement for 
convicted terrorists 
to provide the police 
with personal 
information on their 
release from prison 
and to notify any 
Law on Electronic 
Retention, 2007 – 
Regulation of tele-
Com services and 
their obligations 
to security 
services for the 
retention of key 
information.  
 Royal Decree, 2007 
– 
Assets involved in 
the pursuit of 
terrorism to be 
frozen.  
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changes to this 
information; 
introduction of a 
foreign travel order 
that will enable 
convicted terrorists 
to be banned from 
travelling overseas; 
changes to enable 
post-charge 
questioning of 
terrorist suspects 
and the drawing of 
adverse inferences 
from a refusal to say 
something that is 
later relied on in 
court; enhanced 
sentences for those 
convicted of 
terrorist related 
offences; putting the 
police counter 
terrorist DNA 
database on a sound 
statutory footing 
and making other 
changes to enable 
the full use of DNA 
2006 Terrorism Act of 
2006 
preparatory acts, 
training, 
encouragement to 
terrorism and 
dissemination of 
terrorist publications 
 
_____________
_____ 
Update of: 
Counterterrorism 
Act, 1986/2006 
Terrorism or 
conspiracy now 
punishable by 30 
year jail sentence.  
Law of December 
2005 – 
Defining the role 
and remit of new 
investigative powers 
 
 
Appendix (B): Tabulated Break-down of Statistical Tests and Graphs Utilised in 
Data Analysis 
I. Comparison of Counter-terrorism Strategies in the UK and Spain: Police 
Numbers, Security Expenditure, Prosecutions/Convictions. 
 
Test    Purpose of Test   Result  
Friedman’s Two-Way 
Analysis of Variance/ 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
Test 
Tests of Distribution. To see if the data from the 
UK and Spain is normally 
distributed. 
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One-Sample t-Test Test of Mean Value and 
Variance. 
To validate the data’s 
Mean Value.  
Longitudinal Bar Graph Illustration of change over 
time. 
To illustrate visually the 
change in counter-
terrorism strategy over 
time. 
  
II. Comparison of Counter-terrorism strategies with Terrorism Attack 
Frequency in Each Case Study (The UK and Spain) 
 
Test             Purpose of Test   Result 
One-Sample t-Test Test of Mean Value and 
Variance. 
To validate the data’s 
mean value. 
Pearson’s Product 
Moment Test of 
Correlation 
Test of Association and 
Correlation.  
To identify any 
Association or possible 
Connections in the data of 
counter-terrorism strategy 
and attack frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
